Two Forms of Conditionality of Intercultural Understanding and Three Contemporary Responses

Abstract

Building on a distinction between two kinds of skepticism recently worked out by the American philosopher James Conant, we can differentiate the question of how to overcome the gap between two cultural horizons in intercultural dialogue from the question of how there could even be such dialogue, irrespective of its method, success or failure. While the first question concerns practical conditionality, that is, something we as philosophers have to achieve, the second question concerns transcendental conditionality. After making this distinction clear, the paper presents three cases of recent scholarship on intercultural dialogue, each of which can be read as a response to those two forms of conditionality of intercultural understanding. Those cases are Jean-Yves Heurtebise’s notion of a “transcultural” philosophy, Eric S. Nelson’s work on “intercultural philosophy,” and Kwok-Ying Lau’s concept of a “cultural flesh.” However, while speaking to both forms of conditionality, they tend not to distinguish sufficiently their responses to the two problematics.