{"title":"Electoral Maldistricting","authors":"Andrei Gomberg, Romans Pancs, Tridib Sharma","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3579221","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We introduce a framework to examine, both theoretically and empirically, electoral maldistricting. Maldistricting is defined as districting in pursuit of a policy at the expense of social welfare. Analysis is performed on the set of implementable (via some district map) legislatures, which are characterized geometrically (via majorization) and in information theoretic terms. The index of maldistricting that we propose aligns with courts' purported motivations for requesting redistricting in the three states that form our case study. The maldistricting we document favors Republicans over Democrats.","PeriodicalId":410371,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Microeconomics: Welfare Economics & Collective Decision-Making (Topic)","volume":"64 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2020-04-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"8","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"ERN: Other Microeconomics: Welfare Economics & Collective Decision-Making (Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3579221","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 8
Abstract
We introduce a framework to examine, both theoretically and empirically, electoral maldistricting. Maldistricting is defined as districting in pursuit of a policy at the expense of social welfare. Analysis is performed on the set of implementable (via some district map) legislatures, which are characterized geometrically (via majorization) and in information theoretic terms. The index of maldistricting that we propose aligns with courts' purported motivations for requesting redistricting in the three states that form our case study. The maldistricting we document favors Republicans over Democrats.
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