Game theoretic vulnerability management for secondary frequency control of islanded microgrids against false data injection attacks

IF 1.7 Q3 COMPUTER SCIENCE, INFORMATION SYSTEMS IET Cyber-Physical Systems: Theory and Applications Pub Date : 2021-04-08 DOI:10.1049/cps2.12011
Shichao Liu, Qingyang Li, Bo Chen
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引用次数: 2

Abstract

While most existing works ignore securing the communication of control signals in microgrids' centralized secondary frequency control, here, a stochastic game between the microgrid control centre (MGCC) and the attacker for enhancing the vulnerability of the MGCC to false data injection (FDI) attack (wireless spoof attack) is proposed. The vulnerability to wireless spoof attack is assessed based on the controllability Gramian when the FDI attack is modelled as the malicious control input that aims to drive the microgrid state to undesired values. In the formulated zero-sum two-player Markov game, the state is uniquely associated with the vulnerability index defined by the trace of the controllability Gramian with respect to the attack input. Moreover, the utility function of the stochastic game includes not only the costs related to conducting spoof attack and encryption actions but also the possible remedy costs associated with the resulted vulnerability levels. In turn, the potential impacts of the cyber-layer action choices on the performance of the physical power system are considered when designing the optimal attack and defence strategies. A distribution feeder system with four distributed generators (DGs) is used for simulation studies. The vulnerability assessment results show that the vulnerability level increases when the attacker compromises more on the communication links between the MGCC and DGs. In the simulated game, mixed stationary attack and defence strategies are predominate when considering the uncertainty of the other player.

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孤岛微电网二次频率控制抵御虚假数据注入攻击的博弈论漏洞管理
现有的研究大多忽略了微电网集中二次频率控制中控制信号的通信安全问题,本文提出了一种微电网控制中心(MGCC)与攻击者之间的随机博弈,以提高MGCC对虚假数据注入(FDI)攻击(无线欺骗攻击)的脆弱性。将FDI攻击建模为旨在将微电网状态驱动到不期望值的恶意控制输入,基于可控性Gramian来评估无线欺骗攻击的脆弱性。在公式化的零和二人马尔可夫博弈中,状态与由可控性格拉曼相对于攻击输入的轨迹所定义的漏洞指数唯一相关。此外,随机博弈的效用函数不仅包括与进行欺骗攻击和加密操作相关的成本,还包括与所产生的漏洞级别相关的可能补救成本。进而,在设计最优攻击和防御策略时,考虑网络层行动选择对物理电力系统性能的潜在影响。采用4台分布式发电机组成的配电馈线系统进行了仿真研究。漏洞评估结果表明,攻击者对MGCC和dg之间的通信链路的攻击越多,漏洞等级越高。在模拟博弈中,当考虑到对手的不确定性时,混合静止攻防策略占主导地位。
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来源期刊
IET Cyber-Physical Systems: Theory and Applications
IET Cyber-Physical Systems: Theory and Applications Computer Science-Computer Networks and Communications
CiteScore
5.40
自引率
6.70%
发文量
17
审稿时长
19 weeks
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