Competitive Decolonization and the Algerian War, 1954-62: When Will the Competitors Compete?

Abstract

ABSTRACT This paper examines shifting Soviet and American policies during the 1954–62 Algerian War. It attempts to further develop the theory of competitive decolonization to explain these shifts. This theory argues that states can maximize power in the international system by weakening the empires of other states. Willingness to use this technique is largely a function of security concerns involving the metropolitan power. The theory stresses the role of the great powers in the spread of sovereignty in the international system. In the case examined here, both Moscow and Washington initially held back from supporting Algerian independence due to concerns for relations with France. Nevertheless, both superpowers wound up playing an important role in bringing about Algerian independence. Effective manipulation of both superpowers by the Algerian Front for National Liberation explains much of this. Additionally, Moscow was moved by rivalry from China. Washington’s role included effectively promoting a change in the French government. This bolsters historical findings stressing the importance of agency by Third World actors in the Cold War. The theoretical importance is the need to include the diplomacy of nonstate actors in accounting for shifts in the international system. This work also highlights aspects of relationships between allies.