Auditing Non-GAAP Measures: Signaling More Than Intended

Abstract

Many companies regularly disclose non-GAAP performance measures to communicate firm-specific information that does not fit within the mold of GAAP reporting. However, these non-GAAP measures may have low information content or even be misleading to investors. Thus, some question whether auditors should play a role in the reporting of non-GAAP measures, which currently are not audited. We run an experiment to provide ex ante evidence on the effect of auditing non-GAAP measures. Specifically, we present investor participants with a non-GAAP measure that is either more useful (should be used when making investment judgments) or less useful (should not be used when making investment judgments) and is either audited or is not audited. We find that, when participants view a non-GAAP measure that is more useful, they appropriately use the non-GAAP measure in their investment-related judgments, regardless of whether the measure is audited. However, we find that, while participants appropriately do not use a less useful non-GAAP measure when it is not audited, participants inappropriately do use the less useful non-GAAP measure in their investment-related judgments when it is audited. Mediation results provide evidence consistent with audits increasing investors’ reliance on non-GAAP measures when they are less useful. Overall, our results are consistent with audits of non-GAAP measures signaling more than is intended and have implications for regulators regarding the role of auditors in non-GAAP reporting.