Fdicia and Bank CEO Compensation: An Empirical Investigation

Ellen Ying Yan, J. B. Thomson
{"title":"Fdicia and Bank CEO Compensation: An Empirical Investigation","authors":"Ellen Ying Yan, J. B. Thomson","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.52078","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Banking problems in the 1980s lead to the passing of FDICIA (1991). The purpose of this legislation was to improve market and regulatory discipline on bank performance through changes in the incentive structures for bank regulators and bank stakeholders. Herein, our paper looks at the implications of FDICIA for an important set of private contracts, bank CEO compensation. While subcomponents of bank CEO compensation appear to be more closely tied to market performance after the enactment of FDICIA, total compensation package does not. Hence, our empirical results support the hypothesis that the reregulation embodied FDICIA diminishes the effectiveness of private contracts.","PeriodicalId":233460,"journal":{"name":"Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland Research Paper Series","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"1997-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"4","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland Research Paper Series","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.52078","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4

Abstract

Banking problems in the 1980s lead to the passing of FDICIA (1991). The purpose of this legislation was to improve market and regulatory discipline on bank performance through changes in the incentive structures for bank regulators and bank stakeholders. Herein, our paper looks at the implications of FDICIA for an important set of private contracts, bank CEO compensation. While subcomponents of bank CEO compensation appear to be more closely tied to market performance after the enactment of FDICIA, total compensation package does not. Hence, our empirical results support the hypothesis that the reregulation embodied FDICIA diminishes the effectiveness of private contracts.
查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
fdic与银行CEO薪酬的实证研究
20世纪80年代的银行问题导致了联邦存款保险法案的通过(1991)。这项立法的目的是通过改变银行监管者和银行利益相关者的激励结构来改善银行业绩的市场和监管纪律。在此,我们的论文着眼于fdic对一组重要的私人合同——银行首席执行官薪酬的影响。虽然在《联邦存款保险法案》颁布后,银行首席执行官薪酬的各个部分似乎与市场表现联系更紧密,但总薪酬方案却并非如此。因此,我们的实证结果支持这一假设,即联邦存款保险公司的监管削弱了私人合同的有效性。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
期刊最新文献
Firm Dynamics and SOE Transformation During China's Economic Reform The Macroeconomic Effects of Universal Basic Income Programs Average Inflation Targeting: Time Inconsistency and Intentional Ambiguity IT and Urban Polarization Censored Density Forecasts: Production and Evaluation
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1