Matthew D. Cain, S. McKeon, Steven Davidoff Solomon
{"title":"Do Takeover Laws Matter? Evidence from Five Decades of Hostile Takeovers","authors":"Matthew D. Cain, S. McKeon, Steven Davidoff Solomon","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2517513","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This study evaluates the relation between hostile takeovers and 17 takeover laws from 1965 to 2014. Using a data set of largely exogenous legal changes, we find that certain takeover laws, such as poison pill and business combination laws, have no discernible impact on hostile activity, while others such as fair price laws have reduced hostile takeovers. We construct a Takeover Index from the laws and find that higher takeover protection is associated with lower firm value, consistent with entrenchment and agency costs. However, conditional on a bid, firms with more protection achieve higher premiums, consistent with increased bargaining power.","PeriodicalId":437920,"journal":{"name":"Law & Society: Public Law - Corporations eJournal","volume":"161 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2016-07-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"220","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Law & Society: Public Law - Corporations eJournal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2517513","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 220
Abstract
This study evaluates the relation between hostile takeovers and 17 takeover laws from 1965 to 2014. Using a data set of largely exogenous legal changes, we find that certain takeover laws, such as poison pill and business combination laws, have no discernible impact on hostile activity, while others such as fair price laws have reduced hostile takeovers. We construct a Takeover Index from the laws and find that higher takeover protection is associated with lower firm value, consistent with entrenchment and agency costs. However, conditional on a bid, firms with more protection achieve higher premiums, consistent with increased bargaining power.
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