{"title":"Analysis on collusive game between owner of art work and investor","authors":"J. Ding, Xuefeng Zhang, Yi Wang","doi":"10.1109/ICNC.2011.6022565","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The fraud auction under collusion between owner of art work and investor in the art market may lead to advertisement effect, and affect the emotional estimation and non-rational decision of investor. Consequently, it would do harm to the better development of art market. This article analyzed the root and the realizable condition of collusion between owner and investor. The results showed that the benefits of owner and interior investor in fraud auction would become identical; Strengthening the control of marginal utility of one player may have an effect on the other's collusive activity, and leaded to decrease of fraud auction probability.","PeriodicalId":299503,"journal":{"name":"2011 Seventh International Conference on Natural Computation","volume":"50 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2011-07-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2011 Seventh International Conference on Natural Computation","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/ICNC.2011.6022565","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
The fraud auction under collusion between owner of art work and investor in the art market may lead to advertisement effect, and affect the emotional estimation and non-rational decision of investor. Consequently, it would do harm to the better development of art market. This article analyzed the root and the realizable condition of collusion between owner and investor. The results showed that the benefits of owner and interior investor in fraud auction would become identical; Strengthening the control of marginal utility of one player may have an effect on the other's collusive activity, and leaded to decrease of fraud auction probability.
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