Management Risk and the Cost of Borrowing

Abstract

Risk generated by uncertainty about future management policies appears to affect firms' cost of borrowing. In a sample of S&P 1500 firms between 1987 and 2012, CDS spreads, loan spreads and bond yield spreads all decline over the first three years of CEO tenure, holding other macroeconomic, firm, and security level factors constant. This decline occurs regardless of the reason for the prior CEO's departure. Similar but smaller declines occur following turnovers of CFOs. The spreads are more sensitive to CEO turnover and tenure when the prior uncertainty about the incoming CEO's ability is likely to be higher: when he is not an heir apparent, is an outsider, is younger, or when he does not have a prior relationship with the lender. The spread-tenure sensitivity is also higher when the firm has a higher default risk and when the debt claim is riskier. These patterns are consistent with the view that the decline in spreads in a manager's first three years of tenure reflects the resolution of uncertainty about management. Firms adjust their propensities to issue external debt, precautionary cash holding, and reliance on internal funds in response to these short-term increases in borrowing costs early in their CEOs' tenure.