New Psychological Paradigm for Conditionals and General de Finetti Tables

Jean Baratgin, D. Over, G. Politzer
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引用次数: 28

Abstract

Abstract: The new Bayesian paradigm in the psychology of reasoning aims tointegrate the study of human reasoning, decision making, and rationality. It is supportedby two findings. One, most people judge the probability of the indicative conditional,P(if A then B), to be the conditional probability, P(B|A), as implied by the Ramsey test.Two, they judge if A then B to be void when A is false. Their three-valued responsetable used to be called ‘defective’, but should be termed the de Finetti table. We showhow to study general de Finetti truth tables for negations, conjunctions, disjunctions, andconditionals. 1. Introduction Bayesian models of cognition have become increasingly prominent in thepsychology of reasoning in recent years, and this trend has resulted in thedevelopment of a new Bayesian paradigm (Manktelow, Over and Elqayam, 2011;Oaksford and Chater, 2007, 2009; Over, 2009; Pfeifer and Kleiter, 2010). Theolder binary paradigm in the psychology of reasoning focused on deduction fromassumptions. Propositions were classified as either true or false, or consistent orinconsistent with each other. Conclusions either followed necessarily or not atall. If the participants in a reasoning experiment did not assume the premises, butrelied on their subjectively relevant beliefs, or they inferred conclusions that didnot necessarily follow, they were deemed to be biased and to commit fallacies. Thisolder paradigm inspired many theoretical models (mental rules, mental models,rules or schemas, and others) but limited the field of research to the study of thehuman deduction ability (Evans, 2012). The new paradigm recognizes that mostinferences in everyday affairs and science, whether logically valid or not, are fromuncertain beliefs or hypotheses and not assumptions, and that reasoning must takeaccount of this uncertainty if it is to be useful for acquiring rational beliefs andmaking rational decisions. The basic goal of the new paradigm is to integrate thepsychology of reasoning and the psychology of judgment and decision making andprovide a full account of human reasoning, decision making, and rationality.
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条件句和一般de Finetti表的新心理学范式
摘要:推理心理学中的新贝叶斯范式旨在整合人类推理、决策和理性的研究。这一观点得到了两项发现的支持。第一,大多数人将指示性条件P(如果A则B)的概率判断为条件概率P(B|A),正如拉姆齐检验所暗示的那样。第二,当A为假时,他们判断A和B是否无效。他们的三值责任表过去被称为“缺陷表”,但应该被称为德菲内蒂表。我们展示了如何研究否定、连词、析取和条件句的一般de Finetti真值表。1. 近年来,贝叶斯认知模型在推理心理学中变得越来越突出,这一趋势导致了新的贝叶斯范式的发展(Manktelow, Over和Elqayam, 2011;Oaksford和Chater, 2007, 2009;结束,2009;Pfeifer and Kleiter, 2010)。推理心理学中较早的二元范式侧重于从假设中演绎。命题被划分为真或假,或彼此一致或不一致。结论要么必须遵循,要么根本不遵循。如果推理实验的参与者没有假设前提,而是依赖于他们主观相关的信念,或者他们推断出不一定遵循的结论,他们就被认为有偏见,犯了谬论。这种旧的范式启发了许多理论模型(心理规则、心理模型、规则或图式等),但将研究领域限制在对人类演绎能力的研究上(Evans, 2012)。新范式认识到,日常事务和科学中的大多数推论,无论逻辑上是否有效,都是来自特定的信念或假设,而不是假设,如果推理要对获得理性信念和做出理性决策有用,就必须考虑到这种不确定性。新范式的基本目标是整合推理心理学、判断心理学和决策心理学,并提供人类推理、决策和理性的完整描述。
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