The Distribution and Valuation of Corporate Control

Elli Kraizberg, John L. Teall
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引用次数: 2

Abstract

Direct empirical valuation of corporate control has been hampered by the absence of systematic observable data and verifiable equilibrium models. This paper provides a new analytical framework for valuing voting rights, linking the value of control to the distribution of shares among shareholders along with corresponding Shapley and Owen Power In- dices. The new framework presented here transforms values generated by power indices into game theory/equilibrium fi- nancial values We illustrate our model using numerical methodologies based on share prices paid by agents seeking to control firms as well as market prices paid by shareholders who simply defer control to other agents. The paper also de- rives a simple version of a demand function for corporate control in a setting similar to Jensen and Meckling (1). Using a unique data set of dual class shares, we compare empirical methodologies estimating the value of control to the analytical methodology provided in this paper. This paper structures a new analytical power-based framework intended to value control of the firm as a function of the distribution of its shares, demand function for corpo- rate control and equilibrium conditions that have not been applied in the literature. The model presented here is able to identify the value of control that is associated with shares that are traded in the market by non-control seekers. Using basic assumptions such as an initial "balance of threat" among various rivals who compete for control, the model generates a game theory/equilibrium solution so that values generated by power indices are transformed into equilibrium financial values. An important implication of the model is that overall corporate equity, net of the value of control, is not a simple product of prevailing share market prices and the number of outstanding shares, since even share prices that are held by non-control seekers include a control pre- mium. Prevailing market prices of shares will reflect the dis- tribution of control and the extent to which the transfer of particular shares might impact the outcome of a corporate election. Hence, the marginal value of control associated with a particular share being transferred is expected to be quite different from the average value of control reflected in the overall value of equity. Furthermore, the identities and characteristics of buyers and sellers of given shares impact the values of those shares without necessarily affecting the value of assets yielding private benefits. This paper contributes to existing models valuing private benefits based on share class price differences (e.g., Lease, McConnell and Mikkelson (2) and (3) and Levy (4)) by in- corporating the important relationship between shares distri- bution and value of corporate control. This paper has several
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公司控制权的分配与价值评估
由于缺乏系统的可观察数据和可验证的均衡模型,公司控制权的直接实证评估一直受到阻碍。本文提出了一个新的分析框架,将控制权的价值与股东之间的股份分配联系起来,并提出了相应的Shapley和Owen Power模型。本文提出的新框架将权力指数产生的价值转化为博弈论/均衡金融价值。我们使用数值方法来说明我们的模型,该方法基于寻求控制公司的代理人支付的股价,以及股东支付的市场价格,这些股东只是将控制权移交给其他代理人。本文还在类似于Jensen和Meckling(1)的设置中给出了公司控制权需求函数的简单版本。使用双类股票的独特数据集,我们将估计控制权价值的经验方法与本文提供的分析方法进行了比较。本文构建了一个新的基于权力的分析框架,旨在将公司控制权作为其股份分配的函数、公司利率控制的需求函数和均衡条件的价值,这些在文献中尚未应用。这里提出的模型能够识别与非控制权寻求者在市场上交易的股票相关的控制权价值。该模型使用基本假设,例如在争夺控制权的各种对手之间初始的“威胁平衡”,生成博弈论/均衡解决方案,从而将权力指数产生的价值转化为均衡的财务价值。该模型的一个重要含义是,除去控制权价值后的公司总股本,并不是现行股价与流通股数量的简单乘积,因为即使是非控制权寻求者持有的股价,也包含了控制权溢价。股票的现行市场价格将反映控制权的分配以及特定股份的转让可能影响公司选举结果的程度。因此,与被转让的某一特定股份有关的控制的边际价值预计将与反映在整体权益价值中的控制的平均价值大不相同。此外,给定股票的买家和卖家的身份和特征会影响这些股票的价值,而不一定会影响产生私人利益的资产的价值。本文通过纳入股份分配与公司控制权价值之间的重要关系,对现有的基于股票类别价格差异的私人利益评估模型(如Lease、McConnell和Mikkelson(2)和(3)以及Levy(4))做出了贡献。这篇论文有几个
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