Auction Format and Auction Sequence in Multi-item Multi-unit Auctions: An Experimental Study

IF 3.8 2区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS Economic Journal Pub Date : 2017-10-24 DOI:10.1111/ecoj.12403
Regina Betz, Ben Greiner, Sascha Schweitzer, Stefan Seifert
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引用次数: 6

Abstract

We experimentally study the effect of auction format (sealed-bid versus closed clock versus open clock) and auction sequence (simultaneous versus sequential) on bidding behaviour and auction outcomes in auctions of multiple related multi-unit items. Prominent field applications are the sale of emission permits, fishing rights, and electricity. We find that, when auctioning simultaneously, clock auctions outperform sealed-bid auctions in terms of efficiency and revenues. This advantage disappears when the items are auctioned sequentially. In addition, auctioning sequentially has positive effects on total revenues across all auction formats, resulting from fiercer competition on the item auctioned first.

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多物品多单位拍卖中的拍卖形式与拍卖顺序:实验研究
我们通过实验研究了拍卖形式(封闭式竞价、封闭式竞价、开放式竞价)和拍卖顺序(同步竞价、顺序竞价)对多个相关多单元物品拍卖中的竞价行为和拍卖结果的影响。突出的领域应用是销售排放许可证、捕鱼权和电力。我们发现,当同时拍卖时,时钟拍卖在效率和收入方面优于密封拍卖。当物品按顺序拍卖时,这种优势就消失了。此外,拍卖顺序对所有拍卖形式的总收入都有积极影响,这是由于首先拍卖的物品竞争更激烈。
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来源期刊
Economic Journal
Economic Journal ECONOMICS-
CiteScore
6.60
自引率
3.10%
发文量
82
期刊介绍: The Economic Journal is the Royal Economic Society''s flagship title, and is one of the founding journals of modern economics. Over the past 125 years the journal has provided a platform for high quality and imaginative economic research, earning a worldwide reputation excellence as a general journal publishing papers in all fields of economics for a broad international readership. It is invaluable to anyone with an active interest in economic issues and is a key source for professional economists in higher education, business, government and the financial sector who want to keep abreast of current thinking in economics.
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