Continuous Disclosure: Testing the Correspondence between State Enforcement and Compliance

M. Welsh
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引用次数: 3

Abstract

The literature on regulation theory asserts that regulators are best able to encourage compliance when they are armed with a wide range of sanctions otherwise to compel compliance. It has been argued that the enactment of a wide range of sanctions and the use of those sanctions by a regulator should deter future contraventions of the law and lead to greater compliance. This paper discusses the early findings of a research project that tests some of the assumptions of regulatory theory in the corporate law context. The questions to be examined in the research project are whether or not there is a correspondence between the introduction of an enforcement regime and an increase in the level of compliance with the law which is being enforced, and whether or not there is a correspondence between enforcement activity by a regulator and an increase in the level of compliance with the law which is being enforced. This project aims to test these assumptions in the context of ASIC’s enforcement of the continuous disclosure provisions contained in Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 674(2). That provision requires listed disclosing entities to comply with the continuous disclosure obligation contained in ASX Listing Rule 3.1. Subject to certain exceptions, ASX Listing Rule 3.1 states that ‘[o]nce an entity is or becomes aware of any information concerning it that a reasonable person would expect to have a material effect on the price or value of the entity’s securities, the entity must immediately tell ASX that information.’ If an alleged contravention of Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 674(2) occurs, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) can instigate enforcement action under the criminal, civil penalty or administrative penalty regimes. These regimes were introduced in 1994, 2003 and 2004 respectively. This project will examine data on the disclosure of information to the ASX to determine whether or not the enactment of the different enforcement regimes, and the use of those regimes by ASIC, corresponded with an increase in the level of compliance with the continuous disclosure requirements by disclosing entities. This research project is in its initial stages. Funding for the data collection was obtained in 2008. At the date of writing this paper the data collection had not been completed. The paper sets out the research questions which will be examined, the theory underpinning the project, the reasons for the choice of the continuous disclosure regime, the methodology to be employed, some limitations of the study and some preliminary analysis of the data collected to date.
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持续披露:测试国家执法与合规之间的对应关系
有关监管理论的文献断言,当监管机构拥有广泛的制裁手段以迫使人们遵守规定时,他们最能鼓励人们遵守规定。有人认为,制定范围广泛的制裁措施和由监管机构使用这些制裁措施应能阻止今后违反法律的行为,并导致更大程度的遵守。本文讨论了一个研究项目的早期发现,该项目测试了公司法背景下监管理论的一些假设。在研究项目中要审查的问题是,在引入一种执法制度和提高对正在执行的法律的遵守程度之间是否存在对应关系,以及在监管机构的执法活动和提高对正在执行的法律的遵守程度之间是否存在对应关系。本项目旨在在ASIC执行《2001年公司法》(Cth)第674(2)条中包含的持续披露条款的背景下测试这些假设。该条款要求上市披露实体遵守ASX上市规则3.1中包含的持续披露义务。除某些例外情况外,ASX上市规则3.1规定,“一旦一个实体知道或得知任何有关其的信息,而一个合理的人预计会对该实体的证券价格或价值产生重大影响,该实体必须立即告知ASX该信息。”如果涉嫌违反《2001年公司法》(Cth)第674(2)条的行为发生,澳大利亚证券和投资委员会(ASIC)可以根据刑事、民事或行政处罚制度采取执法行动。这些制度分别于1994年、2003年和2004年推出。该项目将检查向ASX披露信息的数据,以确定不同执法制度的制定以及ASIC对这些制度的使用是否与披露实体对持续披露要求的遵守程度的提高相对应。这个研究项目还处于初级阶段。2008年获得了数据收集的资金。在撰写本文时,数据收集尚未完成。本文列出了将被检查的研究问题,支撑该项目的理论,选择持续披露制度的原因,要采用的方法,研究的一些局限性以及迄今为止收集的数据的一些初步分析。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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