Economic Consequences of Risk and Ability Disclosures: Evidence From Crowdfunding

Joshua M. Madsen, Jeff L. McMullin
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引用次数: 10

Abstract

We exploit the introduction of a "risks and challenges" (RC) section on the crowdfunding website Kickstarter.com to study the role of disclosure in markets characterized by severe information asymmetries and agency frictions. Although the RC section contains voluntary and unaudited disclosures, after its addition projects with already observably risky characteristics attract fewer backers and are less likely to be funded, and project creators who respond to the prompt to discuss risks and abilities increase their non-risk disclosures and use a financing structure that accommodates greater risk. Risky projects attract relatively more backers and funding when project creators respond to the prompt, consistent with increased disclosure mitigating market frictions. Our findings suggest that crowdfunders change the types of projects they support and that project creators modify their disclosures and financing structure when prompted to consider risks.
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风险和能力披露的经济后果:来自众筹的证据
我们利用众筹网站Kickstarter.com上的“风险与挑战”(RC)部分来研究披露在严重信息不对称和代理摩擦的市场中的作用。尽管RC部分包含自愿和未经审计的披露,但在其增加之后,具有明显风险特征的项目吸引的支持者越来越少,获得资助的可能性也越来越小,而响应提示讨论风险和能力的项目创建者增加了他们的非风险披露,并使用了一种适应更大风险的融资结构。当项目创建者对提示做出反应时,高风险项目会吸引相对更多的支持者和资金,这与增加信息披露以缓解市场摩擦相一致。我们的研究结果表明,众筹者会改变他们支持的项目类型,而项目发起人在考虑风险时也会修改他们的披露和融资结构。
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