The Duty to Monitor: Emerging Obligations of Outside Lawyers and Auditors to Detect and Report Corporate Wrongdoing Beyond the Securities Laws

L. Backer
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引用次数: 9

Abstract

Recent legislation - Section 10A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 for auditors and Section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act for lawyers - has imposed on corporate outsiders certain duties to monitor unlawful activity within a corporation, and to report that activity to designated corporate actors. It is generally understood that the monitoring obligations of lawyers and auditors extend to corporate activity which might constitute a violation of federal securities law and state fiduciary duty standards. But do the monitoring and reporting obligations extend to unlawful activities beyond the securities laws - for example to violations of the laws prohibiting racial, religious, ethnic, age and sex discrimination? This article suggests that a strong set of arguments exist to support the answer - yes. The article first demonstrates that the monitoring rules create a broad obligation to detect and report that extends to any violation of law that could have a direct or indirect material effect on the financial condition of the corporation. The article then suggests that the nature of the detection and reporting obligation is active - requiring auditors and lawyers to implement procedures for detecting violations. The failure to comply with the detect and report obligations can contribute, under certain circumstances, to auditor or lawyer liability as a principal under the securities laws, to liability as a principal under the discrimination laws, and to greater exposure to discovery from private plaintiffs. The article ends with an extended hypothetical, involving outside counsel, auditors and a client corporation engaging in potentially discriminatory conduct, in which the insights developed in the article are applied.
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监督的责任:外部律师和审计师在证券法之外发现和报告公司不法行为的新义务
最近的立法——1934年《证券交易法》第10A条针对审计师和《萨班斯-奥克斯利法》第307条针对律师——规定公司外部人员有义务监督公司内部的非法活动,并向指定的公司行为者报告这些活动。一般的理解是,律师和审计师的监督义务延伸到可能构成违反联邦证券法和州信托责任标准的公司活动。但是,监督和报告义务是否延伸到证券法以外的非法活动,例如违反禁止种族、宗教、民族、年龄和性别歧视的法律?这篇文章表明,存在一系列强有力的论据来支持这个答案——是的。本文首先表明,监督规则规定了一项广泛的义务,即发现和报告可能对公司财务状况产生直接或间接重大影响的任何违法行为。然后,文章建议,发现和报告义务的性质是积极的-要求审计师和律师实施发现违规行为的程序。在某些情况下,未能遵守检测和报告义务可能会导致作为委托人的审计师或律师在证券法下承担责任,在歧视法下作为委托人承担责任,并更大程度地暴露于私人原告的发现。文章以一个扩展的假设结束,涉及外部法律顾问,审计师和客户公司从事潜在的歧视性行为,其中应用了文章中发展的见解。
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