Where You Live Matters: Local Bank Competition, Online Marketplace Lending, and Disparity in Borrower Benefits

Mohammed Alyakoob, M. Rahman, Zaiyan Wei
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引用次数: 14

Abstract

In the past decade, the proliferation of online marketplace lending has been disrupting the consumer credit market, especially for personal loans for debt consolidation. These lenders, for example, Lending Club, transcend the geographic boundaries within which local banks operate and offer homogeneous access and terms to borrowers. However, the ultimate benefits borrowers derive from marketplace lending can differ significantly because local alternatives may replace marketplace loans when available and favorable. Correspondingly, if local bank competition drives the substitution of an existing marketplace loan with a traditional bank loan, the promise of equal benefits to all borrowers from marketplace lending is unlikely to fully materialize. This competitive dynamic has implications for policy making, particularly in judging the ramifications of bank mergers and acquisitions (M&As). Our results indicate that a borrower who resides in a more competitive market is more likely to pay off a P2P loan early by making a large, one-time payment compared with a borrower from a less competitive market, indicating a substitution with a local bank loan. Thus, borrowers from different markets do not benefit equally from online marketplace lending, disrupting the consumer credit market. In particular, consumers in smaller markets continue to be disadvantaged because of the absence of competitive intensity. This is a consequence of traditional banks competing within their local markets and incentivized to attract marketplace borrowers to traditional loans primarily by their local market conditions. Therefore, unless geographic frictions in traditional lending markets are removed, digital disruptions cannot equalize the benefits to consumers.
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你住在哪里很重要:本地银行竞争、在线市场贷款和借款人利益差距
在过去的十年里,网络借贷市场的激增已经扰乱了消费信贷市场,尤其是债务整合的个人贷款。这些贷款机构,例如Lending Club,超越了当地银行经营的地理界限,向借款人提供同质的渠道和条款。然而,借款人从市场贷款中获得的最终收益可能会有很大差异,因为当地的替代方案可能会在可用且有利的情况下取代市场贷款。相应地,如果当地银行的竞争促使现有的市场贷款被传统的银行贷款所取代,那么市场贷款给所有借款人带来平等利益的承诺就不太可能完全实现。这种竞争动态对政策制定有影响,特别是在判断银行并购(M&As)的后果时。我们的研究结果表明,与来自竞争不那么激烈的市场的借款人相比,生活在竞争更激烈的市场中的借款人更有可能通过一次性大额付款提前偿还P2P贷款,这表明了当地银行贷款的替代。因此,来自不同市场的借款人并没有从在线市场借贷中获得平等的利益,从而扰乱了消费信贷市场。特别是,较小市场的消费者由于缺乏竞争强度而继续处于不利地位。这是传统银行在当地市场竞争的结果,它们主要是受当地市场条件的激励,吸引市场借款人获得传统贷款。因此,除非消除传统贷款市场的地理摩擦,否则数字中断无法平衡消费者的利益。
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