nShield: a noninvasive NFC security system for mobiledevices

Ruogu Zhou, G. Xing
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引用次数: 30

Abstract

The Near Field Communication (NFC) technology is gaining increasing popularity among mobile users. However, as a relatively new and developing technology, NFC may also introduce security threats that make mobile devices vulnerable to various malicious attacks. This work presents the first system study on the feasibility of and defense again passive NFC eavesdropping. Our experiments show that commodity NFC-enabled mobile devices can be eavesdropped from up to 240 cm away, which is at least an order of magnitude of the intended NFC communication distance. This finding challenges the general perception that NFC is largely immune to eavesdropping because of its short working range. We then present the design of a hardware security system called nShield. With a small form factor, nShield can be attached to the back of mobile devices to attenuate the signal strength against passive eavesdropping. At the same time, the absorbed RF energy is scavenged by nShield for its perpetual operation. nShield intelligently determines the right attenuation level that is just enough to sustain reliable data communication. We implement a prototype of nShield, and evaluate its performance via extensive experiments. Our results show that nShield has low power consumption (23 uW), can harvest significant amount of power (55 mW), and adaptively attenuates the signal strength of NFC in a variety of realistic settings, while only introducing insignificant delay (up to 2.2 s).
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nShield:用于移动设备的非侵入式NFC安全系统
近场通信(NFC)技术在移动用户中越来越受欢迎。然而,作为一项相对较新的发展中技术,NFC也可能带来安全威胁,使移动设备容易受到各种恶意攻击。本文首次对被动近距离通信窃听的可行性和防御进行了系统研究。我们的实验表明,商用NFC移动设备可以在240厘米外被窃听,这至少是预期NFC通信距离的一个数量级。这一发现挑战了人们的普遍看法,即NFC由于工作范围短,在很大程度上不受窃听的影响。然后,我们提出了一个硬件安全系统nShield的设计。由于外形小巧,nShield可以安装在移动设备的背面,以减弱信号强度,防止被动窃听。同时,吸收的射频能量被nShield清除,使其永久工作。nShield智能地确定适当的衰减水平,刚好足以维持可靠的数据通信。我们实现了nShield的原型,并通过大量的实验来评估其性能。我们的研究结果表明,nShield具有低功耗(23 uW),可以收集大量功率(55 mW),并在各种实际设置中自适应衰减NFC的信号强度,同时只引入微不足道的延迟(高达2.2 s)。
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