CEO regulatory focus and management earnings forecasts

IF 2.9 3区 管理学 Q2 BUSINESS, FINANCE Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2023-07-29 DOI:10.1016/j.jcae.2023.100375
Sidharth Murthy , Ferdinand A. Gul , Jun Yao
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Abstract

In this study we examine the association between CEO Regulatory focus (RF) and likelihood, frequency, and accuracy of management earnings forecasts (MEFs). RF theory suggests that an individual makes decisions and pursues goals through either a promotion focus or prevention focus. A promotion focus individual is regulated towards achievements, success, growth, and advancement while a prevention focus individual is regulated towards vigilance, fulfilling basic duties and avoiding the performance of additional tasks. For the period of 2000 to 2018, we find that a CEO promotion focus is associated with higher likelihood, frequency, and accuracy of MEFs. On the other hand, CEO prevention focus results in a lower likelihood and frequency of MEFs. Additionally, the relationship between CEO prevention focus and MEF likelihood and frequency is negatively moderated by higher-level litigation within certain industries. Furthermore, stock return volatility is found to as mediate the relationship between CEOs RF (promotion focus and prevention focus) and MEFs.

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首席执行官监管焦点和管理层盈利预测
在本研究中,我们考察了CEO监管焦点(RF)与管理层盈余预测(mef)的可能性、频率和准确性之间的关系。RF理论认为,个体通过促进或预防两种方式做出决策和追求目标。以促进为重点的个人被调节为成就、成功、成长和进步,而以预防为重点的个人被调节为警惕、履行基本职责和避免执行额外任务。在2000年至2018年期间,我们发现CEO晋升焦点与更高的mef可能性、频率和准确性相关。另一方面,CEO对预防的关注导致mef发生的可能性和频率降低。此外,在某些行业中,CEO预防焦点与MEF可能性和频率之间的关系被更高级别的诉讼负向调节。此外,我们还发现股票收益波动率在ceo RF(促进焦点和预防焦点)与mef之间起到中介作用。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
6.00
自引率
3.00%
发文量
24
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