{"title":"International Spill-Over Effects of Labour Market Rigidities","authors":"Morten Spange","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.430041","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This paper analyses the implications of real wage rigidities in a stochastic two-country general equilibrium model. It is shown how real wage rigidities in one country affect welfare in both countries. Assuming that the choice of whether or not to adopt flexible wages is in the hands of labour unions within each country, it is found that wages will be flexible in either no, one or both countries. Hence, even in this symmetric model flexible wages in one country and rigid wages in the other may be an equilibrium. Since there are international spillover effects of the choice of wage setting regime, the utilitarian solution is also considered. Interestingly, this does not necessarily entail more real wage flexibility than in the Nash equilibrium.","PeriodicalId":181797,"journal":{"name":"European Economics eJournal","volume":"27 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2008-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"3","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"European Economics eJournal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.430041","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Abstract
This paper analyses the implications of real wage rigidities in a stochastic two-country general equilibrium model. It is shown how real wage rigidities in one country affect welfare in both countries. Assuming that the choice of whether or not to adopt flexible wages is in the hands of labour unions within each country, it is found that wages will be flexible in either no, one or both countries. Hence, even in this symmetric model flexible wages in one country and rigid wages in the other may be an equilibrium. Since there are international spillover effects of the choice of wage setting regime, the utilitarian solution is also considered. Interestingly, this does not necessarily entail more real wage flexibility than in the Nash equilibrium.