Incentivising Cooperation between Agents for Content Sharing

S. M. Allen, M. J. Chorley, Gualtiero Colombo, R. Whitaker
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

The performance of many emerging communication paradigms depend on high levels of cooperation amongst the peers in the network. Although an individual’s best strategy may be to selfishly consume resources without reciprocation, the optimal social performance requires agents in the network to behave in an altruistic manner. This paper considers a P2P data dissemination scenario, and applies an autonomic trust protocol that forms social network structures to incentive cooperation. Trust links are formed according to the simple criterion that ‘individuals seek to interact with others at least as cooperative as themselves’ and these links are used to prioritise the choice of peers to interact with. The success of the protocol is validated through a prisoner’s dilemma based simulation which uses the similarity of interest between peers to define pay-offs. While the variation in interests reduces the average payoff (per iteration) received by the most cooperative individuals, only the most ‘divergent’ and uncooperative nodes are heavily affected and ostracized from interaction by other cooperative nodes.
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激励代理之间的合作以实现内容共享
许多新出现的通信范式的性能依赖于网络中对等体之间的高水平合作。尽管个人的最佳策略可能是自私地消耗资源而没有回报,但最优的社会绩效要求网络中的代理以利他的方式行事。本文考虑了一个P2P数据传播场景,并应用一种自主信任协议来形成社会网络结构来激励合作。信任联系是根据一个简单的标准形成的,即“个人寻求与他人至少像自己一样合作”,这些联系用于优先选择与之互动的同伴。通过基于囚徒困境的模拟来验证协议的成功,该模拟使用对等体之间的兴趣相似性来定义收益。虽然利益的变化降低了最合作个体获得的平均收益(每次迭代),但只有最“发散”和最不合作的节点受到严重影响,并被其他合作节点排斥。
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