Moral responsibility and IT for human enhancement.

Abstract

What can be said against a moral obligation to use IT for enhancement purposes? Some have argued - and it is very well conceivable that this is an increasingly common conception - that we may have a moral obligation to use IT for enhancing human bodies and human decision-making, for instance by using computers for moral decision-making in cases in which we are dealing with a high level of (moral) complexity such as euthanasia decisions. In this paper I will formulate some objections against the suggestion made by some that IT tools can and ought to be used for human enhancement, in the sense of improving moral decision-making.If we were to use IT for enhancement purposes, what would be the problems? In this paper I will discuss some problems, such as moral deskilling, epistemic dependence, the allocation of responsibility for IT support, and epistemic paternalism. The conclusion is that it is questionable whether we can speak of a moral obligation to use IT tools for human enhancement. IT is certainly extremely helpful in improving decision-making and improving the quality of life as conceived by some. However, speaking of a moral obligation seems too strong of a claim or at least it should be reconsidered in light of the issues here discussed.