Are Sunk Costs a Barrier to Entry?

Luís M. B. Cabral, T. W. Ross
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引用次数: 37

Abstract

The received wisdom is that sunk costs create a barrier to entry - if entry fails, then the entrant, unable to recover sunk costs, incurs greater losses. In a strategic context where an incumbent may prey on the entrant, sunk entry costs have a countervailing effect: they may effectively commit the entrant to stay in the market. By providing the entrant with commitment power, sunk investments may soften the reactions of incumbents. The net effect may imply that entry is more profitable when sunk costs are greater.
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沉没成本是进入壁垒吗?
公认的观点是,沉没成本制造了进入壁垒——如果进入失败,那么无法收回沉没成本的进入者将招致更大的损失。在战略背景下,在位者可能会掠夺进入者,沉没进入成本具有抵消效应:它们可能有效地使进入者留在市场中。通过为新进入者提供承诺力,沉没的投资可能会缓和现有者的反应。净效应可能意味着,当沉没成本更高时,进入更有利可图。
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