Liberty and Suspension in Locke’s Essay

Matthew A. Leisinger
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Abstract

I argue for two controversial claims about Locke’s account of liberty in Essay 2.21. The first claim is that Locke does not identify liberty with freedom of action. Instead, Locke places further conditions on liberty beyond to the power to perform or forbear an action at will. The second (and closely related) claim is that Locke takes the power to suspend and examine desire to be necessary for liberty—in other words, that possession of the power to suspend and examine desire is one such further condition upon liberty.
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洛克随笔中的自由与悬置
关于洛克在论文2.21中对自由的描述,我提出了两个有争议的观点。第一种观点是洛克没有将自由等同于行动自由。相反,洛克把更多的条件放在自由之上,而不是随意执行或放弃行动的权力。第二个(与此密切相关的)主张是,洛克认为暂停和检查欲望的权力是自由的必要条件——换句话说,拥有暂停和检查欲望的权力是自由的进一步条件之一。
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