{"title":"Bars to relief","authors":"M. Bryan, Simone Degeling, M. Donald, Vicki Vann","doi":"10.1017/CBO9781107445499.007","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Introduction Plaintiffs may have an ‘equity for relief’ but this does not mean that the plaintiff holds a right to relief. All equitable relief is discretionary, and judicial discretion is exercised in a principled manner. The court considers the surrounding circumstances of the case, weighing factors from both the plaintiff's and defendant's perspectives in fashioning an appropriate remedy. Principles informing the exercise of equitable discretion include the doctrines of laches and acquiescence, unclean hands and hardship to the defendant. Additionally, a court exercising equitable jurisdiction will not make an order that is futile or impossible to supervise. The impact of the court's order on third parties will also be considered. These factors apply generally to all equitable remedies. The availability of specific performance is additionally controlled by particular discretionary grounds: want of mutuality and the plaintiff's willingness and readiness to perform her own obligations (see chapter 3 and textbook at [3.3]–[3.5]). Bars to relief are sometimes referred to as equitable defences but properly understood they are not true defences. Since there is no right to relief, any equity held by the plaintiff is coextensive with the extent to which equitable discretion will bend in her favour. However, there are true equitable defences which are considered elsewhere in this book: for example, estoppel can operate as a defence (see chapter 7). Questions for consideration 1. When an application is made for an equitable remedy, what factors ‘tend towards the justice or injustice of granting the remedy that is sought’ ( Bridgewater v Leahy (1998) 194 CLR 457, 494)? 2. Is the court's discretion a rule-based discretion or is it an unbounded discretion? 3. Are the conduct and conscience of both the plaintiff and defendant relevant to the court's deliberations? Laches Equity denies relief for stale demands. Where an equitable cause of action is brought ( Orr v Ford (1989) 167 CLR 316 at 340) and there is delay in bringing or prosecuting the claim, it may be open to the defendant to raise the delay and the impact of this delay in resisting a remedy. Lindsay Petroleum Co v Hurd (1874) LR 5 PC 221 Background Land owned by Kemp was thought to contain oil.","PeriodicalId":193827,"journal":{"name":"A Sourcebook on Equity and Trusts in Australia","volume":"349 3","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2012-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"A Sourcebook on Equity and Trusts in Australia","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107445499.007","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Introduction Plaintiffs may have an ‘equity for relief’ but this does not mean that the plaintiff holds a right to relief. All equitable relief is discretionary, and judicial discretion is exercised in a principled manner. The court considers the surrounding circumstances of the case, weighing factors from both the plaintiff's and defendant's perspectives in fashioning an appropriate remedy. Principles informing the exercise of equitable discretion include the doctrines of laches and acquiescence, unclean hands and hardship to the defendant. Additionally, a court exercising equitable jurisdiction will not make an order that is futile or impossible to supervise. The impact of the court's order on third parties will also be considered. These factors apply generally to all equitable remedies. The availability of specific performance is additionally controlled by particular discretionary grounds: want of mutuality and the plaintiff's willingness and readiness to perform her own obligations (see chapter 3 and textbook at [3.3]–[3.5]). Bars to relief are sometimes referred to as equitable defences but properly understood they are not true defences. Since there is no right to relief, any equity held by the plaintiff is coextensive with the extent to which equitable discretion will bend in her favour. However, there are true equitable defences which are considered elsewhere in this book: for example, estoppel can operate as a defence (see chapter 7). Questions for consideration 1. When an application is made for an equitable remedy, what factors ‘tend towards the justice or injustice of granting the remedy that is sought’ ( Bridgewater v Leahy (1998) 194 CLR 457, 494)? 2. Is the court's discretion a rule-based discretion or is it an unbounded discretion? 3. Are the conduct and conscience of both the plaintiff and defendant relevant to the court's deliberations? Laches Equity denies relief for stale demands. Where an equitable cause of action is brought ( Orr v Ford (1989) 167 CLR 316 at 340) and there is delay in bringing or prosecuting the claim, it may be open to the defendant to raise the delay and the impact of this delay in resisting a remedy. Lindsay Petroleum Co v Hurd (1874) LR 5 PC 221 Background Land owned by Kemp was thought to contain oil.
原告可能拥有“救济衡平法”,但这并不意味着原告拥有救济权利。所有衡平法上的救济都是自由裁量权,司法自由裁量权的行使是有原则的。法院考虑案件的周围情况,从原告和被告的角度权衡各种因素,以形成适当的补救办法。指导公平裁量权行使的原则包括懈怠和默许、不洁手和被告人的困难等原则。此外,行使衡平法管辖权的法院不会作出无效或无法监督的命令。法院的命令对第三方的影响也将被考虑。这些因素一般适用于所有衡平法救济。具体履行的可获得性还受到特定的自由裁量理由的控制:缺乏相互关系以及原告履行自己义务的意愿和准备(见第3章和教科书[3.3]-[3.5])。救济限制有时被称为衡平法抗辩,但正确理解它们并不是真正的抗辩。由于没有获得救济的权利,原告所持有的任何衡平法衡平法裁量权将在多大程度上向原告倾斜。然而,真正的衡平法抗辩在本书的其他地方被考虑:例如,禁止反悔可以作为一种抗辩(见第7章)。当申请衡平法救济时,哪些因素“倾向于给予所寻求的救济的公正或不公正”(Bridgewater v Leahy (1998) 194 CLR 457, 494)?2. 法院的自由裁量权是基于规则的自由裁量权还是不受限制的自由裁量权?3.原告和被告的行为和良心是否与法庭的审议有关?Laches Equity否认对陈腐需求的救济。如果提出了衡平法因由(Orr v Ford (1989) 167 CLR 316 at 340),并且在提出或起诉索赔时存在延迟,被告可以提出延迟以及这种延迟对抵制救济的影响。林赛石油公司诉赫德(1874)背景肯普拥有的土地被认为含有石油。