A Theory of Private vs. Public Placements in Public Firms

Marc Martos-Vila
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引用次数: 13

Abstract

This paper studies a public firm's investment decision and whether to raise the equity capital needed using the public market (SEO, Secondary Equity Offering) or a private channel (PIPE, Private Investment in Public Equity). Issuing a PIPE allows the firm to enjoy more financial flexibility. This is modeled in two dimensions: First, funds can be raised faster. Second, dilution costs caused by asymmetric information can be alleviated endogenously. However PIPEs are costly because new shares are temporarily illiquid. The model explains what firms use one market or the other and the optimal timing of investments to better use financial flexibility. For instance, market illiquidity makes the firm less likely to issue a PIPE, asymmetric information makes it more likely. The paper then considers private debt contracts and shows that the pecking order need not hold. The model explains empirical regularities, for instance, why do SEOs have negative abnormal returns around its announcement whereas abnormal returns for PIPEs are positive.
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上市公司私人配售与公开配售理论
本文研究了上市公司的投资决策,以及是通过公开市场(SEO, Secondary equity Offering)还是私人渠道(PIPE, private investment in public equity)筹集所需的股权资本。发行PIPE允许公司享有更大的财务灵活性。这可以从两个方面进行建模:首先,可以更快地筹集资金。其次,信息不对称导致的稀释成本可以内生缓解。然而,管道价格昂贵,因为新股暂时缺乏流动性。该模型解释了企业如何利用一个市场或另一个市场,以及投资的最佳时机,以更好地利用财务灵活性。例如,市场流动性不足使公司不太可能发行PIPE,而信息不对称则使其更有可能发行PIPE。然后,本文考虑了私人债务合同,并表明这种等级顺序不一定成立。该模型解释了经验规律,例如,为什么seo在其公告周围有负的异常回报,而管道的异常回报是正的。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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