Warranty Length, Product Reliability, and Secondary Markets

Wayne Fu, A. Atasu, Necati Tereyağoğlu
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引用次数: 4

Abstract

Problem definition: Inspired by variations in warranty length specifications in the U.S. automotive industry, we study how a durable good producer’s product warranty length choice relates to its product reliability. We introduce a producer’s secondary market interference (e.g., buyback of used products) as a possible driver for such variations observed in practice. Methodology/results: Using an analytical model of a monopolist finitely durable good producer, we first study the interaction between product reliability and the producer’s warranty length choice in the presence of secondary market interference. This analysis suggests that a durable good producer’s warranty length offering is U-shaped in its product reliability. That is, only producers with sufficiently low or high product reliability benefit from offering longer product warranties. Otherwise, a short warranty offering is preferred. We show that this result is driven by a producer’s strategic use of secondary market interference. We then test the predictions from these results in the automotive industry. An exploratory analysis of U.S. automotive industry data also suggests a U-shaped association between warranty offerings and product reliability, and points to the theoretically predicted dependency between producers’ secondary market interference and warranty length. Managerial implications: Producers with sufficiently high product reliability will benefit from longer warranties, as longer warranty coverage has marginal impact on their new product demand cannibalization by used products and warranty fulfillment costs. In contrast, producers with sufficiently low product reliability can use secondary market interference to jointly avoid the cannibalization from used products and high warranty fulfilment costs associated with long warranties for low reliability products. Producers with moderate product reliability, on the other hand, cannot leverage secondary market interference as effectively, and benefit more from shorter warranty offerings.
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保修期、产品可靠性和二级市场
问题定义:受美国汽车行业保修期限规格变化的启发,我们研究了耐用产品生产商的产品保修期限选择与产品可靠性之间的关系。我们将生产商对二级市场的干扰(例如,回购二手产品)作为实践中观察到的此类变化的可能驱动因素。方法/结果:利用垄断性有限耐用商品生产商的分析模型,首先研究了二级市场干扰下产品可靠性与生产商保修期限选择之间的相互作用。这一分析表明,耐用产品生产商提供的保修期长度在其产品可靠性上呈u形。也就是说,只有产品可靠性足够低或足够高的生产商才能从提供更长的产品保修期中受益。否则,短期保修是首选。我们表明,这一结果是由生产者对二级市场干预的战略使用驱动的。然后,我们在汽车行业中测试这些结果的预测。对美国汽车行业数据的一项探索性分析也表明,保修服务与产品可靠性之间呈u型关系,并指出了理论上预测的生产商对二级市场的干预与保修期限之间的依赖关系。管理含义:具有足够高产品可靠性的生产商将受益于较长的保修,因为较长的保修范围对他们的新产品需求和旧产品的蚕食以及保修履行成本的影响很小。相比之下,产品可靠性足够低的生产商可以利用二级市场干扰来共同避免二手产品的蚕食,以及低可靠性产品的长期保修所带来的高保修履行成本。另一方面,产品可靠性中等的生产商不能有效地利用二级市场的干扰,并从较短的保修提供中获益更多。
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