Policy vs. mechanism in the Secure TUNIS operating system

Gideon Grenier, R. Holt, M. Funkenhauser
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引用次数: 4

Abstract

The trusted computing base (TCB) of a secure operating system can have its security policy enforced by a small, provably correct security manager. The design of the Secure TUNIS (Toronto University system) operating system divides security concerns into policy (implemented by its security manager) and mechanism (implemented by the rest of the operating system). It is shown that this separation is a key concept in allowing Secure TUNIS to be validated, due to the isolation of security critical code and data in a small module. This design provides the basis of an implementation of a POSIX (Unix) kernel that can be certified at security levels of B3 and above. The security policy, as implemented by Secure TUNIS, is given.<>
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安全突尼斯操作系统中的策略与机制
安全操作系统的可信计算基础(TCB)可以由一个小型的、可证明正确的安全管理器执行其安全策略。Secure TUNIS(多伦多大学系统)操作系统的设计将安全关注点分为策略(由其安全管理器实现)和机制(由操作系统的其余部分实现)。结果表明,由于将安全关键代码和数据隔离在一个小模块中,因此这种分离是验证Secure TUNIS的关键概念。该设计为POSIX (Unix)内核的实现提供了基础,该内核可以通过B3及以上安全级别的认证。安全策略由Secure TUNIS实现,给出。>
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