Securitization, Deregulation, Economic Stability, And Financial Crisis, Part II - Deregulation, the Financial Crisis, and Policy Implications

Éric Tymoigne
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引用次数: 14

Abstract

This study analyzes the trends in the financial sector over the past 30 years, and argues that unsupervised financial innovations and lenient government regulation are at the root of the current financial crisis and recession. Combined with a long period of economic expansion during which default rates were stable and low, deregulation and unsupervised financial innovations generated incentives to make risky financial decisions. Those decisions were taken because it was the only way for financial institutions to maintain market share and profitability. Thus, rather than putting the blame on individuals, this paper places it on an economic setup that requires the growing use of Ponzi processes during enduring economic expansion, and on a regulatory system that is unwilling to recognize (on the contrary, it contributes to) the intrinsic instability of market mechanisms. Subprime lending, greed, and speculation are merely aspects of the larger mechanisms at work. It is argued that we need to change the way we approach the regulation of financial institutions and look at what has been done in other sectors of the economy, where regulation and supervision are proactive and carefully implemented in order to guarantee the safety of society. The criterion for regulation and supervision should be neither Wall Street's nor Main Street's interests but rather the interests of the socioeconomic system. The latter requires financial stability if it's to raise, durably, the standard of living of both Wall Street and Main Street. Systemic stability, not profits or homeownership, should be the paramount criterion for financial regulation, since systemic stability is required to maintain the profitability--and ultimately, the existence--of any capitalist economic entity. The role of the government is to continually counter the Ponzi tendencies of market mechanisms, even if they are (temporarily) improving standards of living, and to encourage economic agents to develop safe and reliable financial practices. See also, Working Paper No. 573.1, "Securitization, Deregulation, Economic Stability, and Financial Crisis, Part I: The Evolution of Securitization."
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证券化,放松管制,经济稳定和金融危机,第二部分-放松管制,金融危机和政策影响
本研究分析了过去30年金融行业的发展趋势,认为无监管的金融创新和宽松的政府监管是当前金融危机和经济衰退的根源。再加上违约率稳定且处于低位的长期经济扩张,放松管制和不受监管的金融创新催生了做出高风险金融决策的动机。之所以做出这些决定,是因为这是金融机构维持市场份额和盈利能力的唯一途径。因此,本文并没有将责任归咎于个人,而是将其归咎于在持续的经济扩张过程中需要越来越多地使用庞氏过程的经济结构,以及不愿承认(相反,它助长了)市场机制内在不稳定性的监管体系。次级贷款、贪婪和投机只是在起作用的更大机制的各个方面。有人认为,我们需要改变我们对待金融机构监管的方式,并看看在其他经济领域所做的事情,在这些领域,监管和监督是积极主动、认真实施的,以确保社会安全。监管的标准既不应该是华尔街的利益,也不应该是普通民众的利益,而应该是社会经济体系的利益。如果要持久地提高华尔街和普通民众的生活水平,后者就需要金融稳定。金融监管的首要标准应该是系统稳定,而不是利润或房屋所有权,因为任何资本主义经济实体都需要系统稳定来维持其盈利能力,并最终维持其存在。政府的角色是不断地对抗市场机制的庞氏倾向,即使它们(暂时)提高了生活水平,并鼓励经济主体发展安全可靠的金融行为。另见工作文件573.1,“证券化、放松管制、经济稳定和金融危机,第一部分:证券化的演变”。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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