The Regulation of Mutual Fund Debt

J. Morley
{"title":"The Regulation of Mutual Fund Debt","authors":"J. Morley","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2070884","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This Article offers the first general examination of mutual fund capital structure regulation under the Investment Company Act of 1940. Such an examination is long overdue, because American mutual funds collectively hold $12 trillion in assets—about as much as the commercial banking industry—and regulation constrains their use of debt capital very tightly. The Article reaches two conclusions: First, the regulation of mutual funds’ capital structure is incoherent. Although we might imagine several purposes for this regulation, such as limiting risks to investors and the financial system and preventing investor confusion, the regulation is not actually consistent with these purposes. It does both too much and too little to achieve them. Second, although at present the only type of security mutual funds can issue is common stock, there is no compelling reason why they should not also be allowed to issue debt securities. Debt securities might benefit investors by offering a safer and more stable alternative to the common stock of money market funds. Unlike shares in money market funds, debt securities could offer fixed interest rates and the safety of senior priorities. Such a proposal is clearly feasible, because mutual funds already borrow from banks and derivative counterparties and they issued debt securities without problems in the era before regulation.","PeriodicalId":431402,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Securities Law: U.S. (Topic)","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2012-09-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"12","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"LSN: Securities Law: U.S. (Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2070884","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 12

Abstract

This Article offers the first general examination of mutual fund capital structure regulation under the Investment Company Act of 1940. Such an examination is long overdue, because American mutual funds collectively hold $12 trillion in assets—about as much as the commercial banking industry—and regulation constrains their use of debt capital very tightly. The Article reaches two conclusions: First, the regulation of mutual funds’ capital structure is incoherent. Although we might imagine several purposes for this regulation, such as limiting risks to investors and the financial system and preventing investor confusion, the regulation is not actually consistent with these purposes. It does both too much and too little to achieve them. Second, although at present the only type of security mutual funds can issue is common stock, there is no compelling reason why they should not also be allowed to issue debt securities. Debt securities might benefit investors by offering a safer and more stable alternative to the common stock of money market funds. Unlike shares in money market funds, debt securities could offer fixed interest rates and the safety of senior priorities. Such a proposal is clearly feasible, because mutual funds already borrow from banks and derivative counterparties and they issued debt securities without problems in the era before regulation.
查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
共同基金债务的规管
本文首次对1940年《投资公司法》下的共同基金资本结构监管进行了全面考察。这样的检查早该进行了,因为美国共同基金总共持有12万亿美元的资产——大约相当于商业银行业的资产——而监管严格限制了它们对债务资本的使用。本文得出两个结论:第一,对共同基金资本结构的监管不连贯。尽管我们可以想象这一监管的几个目的,比如限制投资者和金融体系的风险,防止投资者混淆,但实际上,这一监管与这些目的并不一致。要实现这些目标,它既做得太多,也做得太少。第二,尽管目前共同基金唯一可以发行的证券类型是普通股,但没有令人信服的理由说明为什么它们也不应该被允许发行债务证券。债务证券为投资者提供了一种比货币市场基金普通股更安全、更稳定的选择,可能会令投资者受益。与货币市场基金的股票不同,债务证券可以提供固定利率和优先事项的安全性。这样的提议显然是可行的,因为共同基金已经从银行和衍生品交易对手处借款,而且它们发行的债务证券在监管之前的时代没有任何问题。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
期刊最新文献
Raiders, Activists, and the Risk of Mistargeting The Economics of Securities Regulation: A Survey Autonomous Vehicles, Moral Hazards & the "AV Problem" Regulatory transparency and the alignment of private and public enforcement: Evidence from the public disclosure of SEC comment letters The '7% Solution' and IPO (Under)Pricing
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1