Utility-Efficient Payoffs

Stefan Kassberger, Thomas Liebmann
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Abstract

We show how to improve payoffs such that any portfolio composed of contracts with the improved payoffs is more attractive than the corresponding portfolio with the original payoffs.Starting from an axiomatic characterisation, we derive an amelioration operator that yields payoffs attractive to both risk averse buyers and sellers of financial contracts, including individuals with robust Savage preferences. For comparison with our approach, we briefly recall and slightly generalise core results on expected utility optimisation and cost-efficient payoffs.Furthermore, we obtain a new variant of the axiomatic characterisation of pricing operators and show that ameliorated payoffs do not admit generalised statistical arbitrage.
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Utility-Efficient回报
我们展示了如何改进收益,使任何由具有改进收益的合同组成的投资组合比具有原始收益的相应投资组合更具吸引力。从一个公理化特征出发,我们推导出一个改进算子,它产生的收益对金融合约的风险厌恶的买家和卖家都有吸引力,包括具有稳健Savage偏好的个人。为了与我们的方法进行比较,我们简要回顾并稍微概括了预期效用优化和成本效益回报的核心结果。此外,我们得到了定价算子的公理化特征的一个新变体,并证明改进后的收益不允许广义的统计套利。
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