Amy Babay, John L. Schultz, Thomas Tantillo, Samuel Beckley, Eamon Jordan, Kevin T. Ruddell, Kevin Jordan, Y. Amir
{"title":"Deploying Intrusion-Tolerant SCADA for the Power Grid","authors":"Amy Babay, John L. Schultz, Thomas Tantillo, Samuel Beckley, Eamon Jordan, Kevin T. Ruddell, Kevin Jordan, Y. Amir","doi":"10.1109/DSN.2019.00043","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"While there has been considerable research on making power grid Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems resilient to attacks, the problem of transitioning these technologies into deployed SCADA systems remains largely unaddressed. We describe our experience and lessons learned in deploying an intrusion-tolerant SCADA system in two realistic environments: a red team experiment in 2017 and a power plant test deployment in 2018. These experiences resulted in technical lessons related to developing an intrusion-tolerant system with a real deployable application, preparing a system for deployment in a hostile environment, and supporting protocol assumptions in that hostile environment. We also discuss some meta-lessons regarding the cultural aspects of transitioning academic research into practice in the power industry.","PeriodicalId":271955,"journal":{"name":"2019 49th Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks (DSN)","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2019-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"24","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2019 49th Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks (DSN)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/DSN.2019.00043","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 24
Abstract
While there has been considerable research on making power grid Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems resilient to attacks, the problem of transitioning these technologies into deployed SCADA systems remains largely unaddressed. We describe our experience and lessons learned in deploying an intrusion-tolerant SCADA system in two realistic environments: a red team experiment in 2017 and a power plant test deployment in 2018. These experiences resulted in technical lessons related to developing an intrusion-tolerant system with a real deployable application, preparing a system for deployment in a hostile environment, and supporting protocol assumptions in that hostile environment. We also discuss some meta-lessons regarding the cultural aspects of transitioning academic research into practice in the power industry.