Self-defense Regulations and Crime

Ye Hong, L. Yin
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Abstract

This paper uncovers the mechanism behind the relaxation of self-defense regulations with an empirical analysis followed by a game theoretical model. We obtained empirical evidence from examining the Stand Your Ground (SYG) law and subsequent changes in rates of planned and unplanned murder. We found that the SYG law increased planned murder rate by 7.6%, while it increased unplanned murder rate by 10.4%, on average across specification. Inspired by the differences, we built a game theory model based on Becker [1968] to explain the mechanisms. Faced with an increased likelihood of self-defense from the victim, some offenders of planned murder would be deterred, but others would prepare more thoroughly. Since offenders are often more experienced than victims in carrying out criminal activities, their improved preparations are likely to increase their success rate. On the contrary, offenders who act on-the-spot are less likely to improve their efforts more than the victims. In this case, if offenders are aggravated by victims’ defense, a more minor offense is likely to turn into murder. To decrease the success rate of planned murder, community-based approaches might be helpful (Makarios and Pratt [2012]). However, to prevent conversions of other kinds of crimes to unplanned murder, policy makers might want to reconsider the law.
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自卫条例与犯罪
本文通过实证分析和博弈论模型揭示了自我防卫规制放宽的机制。我们通过检验“不退让法”(SYG)以及随后有计划和计划外谋杀率的变化,获得了经验证据。我们发现,在不同规格的平均水平上,SYG法使计划谋杀率增加了7.6%,而使计划外谋杀率增加了10.4%。受这些差异的启发,我们建立了一个基于Becker[1968]的博弈论模型来解释机制。面对受害者自卫的可能性增加,一些预谋谋杀的罪犯会被吓住,但另一些人会做更彻底的准备。由于罪犯在实施犯罪活动方面往往比受害者更有经验,他们改进的准备工作可能会增加他们的成功率。相反,当场行动的罪犯比受害者更不可能改进他们的努力。在这种情况下,如果罪犯因受害者的辩护而加重,那么更轻微的犯罪就有可能演变成谋杀。为了降低计划谋杀的成功率,以社区为基础的方法可能会有所帮助(Makarios和Pratt[2012])。然而,为了防止其他类型的犯罪转变为计划外谋杀,政策制定者可能需要重新考虑这项法律。
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