The Resilience of ‘Bad Ideas’ in Eurozone Crisis Discourse, Even as Rival Ideas Inform Changing Practices

Abstract

In the Eurozone Crisis, ‘bad ideas’ were initially resilient not just in the discourse but also in practice, as neo-liberal ideas focused on austerity and structural reform were embedded in the legislative packages and intergovernmental pacts (Six Pack, Two Pack, and Fiscal Compact). Later, however, the bad ideas continued to be resilient in the discourse while the practices incrementally changed for the better as rival ideas gain influence. This paper explains why such discursive resilience through an empirical examination of EU political actors’ discourse first in their initial response to the crisis that reinforced the ‘stability’ rules and then in their shift first to a discourse of growth and then of flexibility, all the while insisting that they were sticking by the rules. The paper argues, in essence, that leaders chose to reinterpret the rules ‘by stealth,’ that is, by not admitting to their national constituencies—or even to one another—that their ideas weren’t working, and that the rules therefore needed to change. Theoretically, the paper explains this according to five possible reasons for the resilience of neo-liberal ideas, including the adaptability of the concepts, their lack of actual implementation, their strength in the discourse compared to alternatives, the role of interests in benefiting from those ideas, and their embedding in institutions.