Admission control and power allocation in wireless power charging networks

Abstract

We analyze a wireless power charging network to find the best users' admission policy and power allocation by the wireless power charger (WPC). The objective of the WPC is to maximize its utility while keeping the users' satisfaction up to their required level. This optimum strategy depends on the users' bids and on the WPC's knowledge about the users' requests and the network parameters. Here, the network is modeled by an M/M/N/N queue. The competition of users is modeled using game theory, and the game model is embedded in a continuous-time Markov process model. If a user is admitted by the WPC, the latter broadcasts its new budgeted allocation, after which the users compete for the power in a non-cooperative game by broadcasting their bids. Knowing other bids, users renew and then broadcast their own bids until convergence to the Nash Equilibrium strategy. When a new user places an admission request, the WPC — desiring to maximize its profit with regard to the current users' utilities — decides to whether admit or reject the request by solving a constrained non-linear optimization problem. The performance of the proposed admission and power charging policy is analyzed.