De Viti De Marco vs. Ricardo on Public Debt: Self Extinction or Default?

G. Eusepi, R. Wagner
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引用次数: 3

Abstract

The most prominent Italian theorist of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Antonio de Viti de Marco, accepted David Ricardo’s proposition that an extraordinary tax and a public loan are equivalent. Despite this common point of analytical departure, their theories of public debt diverged sharply. In this divergence, moreover, lies a fundamental gulf between two distinct analytical schemes for connecting the micro and macro levels of analysis. Ricardo treated macro aggregates as analytical primitives, with individual action being induced from those aggregates. In sharp contrast, de Viti took individual variables as primitive, with aggregate conditions being induced from interaction among those individual variables. Within de Viti’s framework of a fully cooperative state, public debt would be self-extinguishing. De Viti also recognized that democracies were never exclusively cooperative, as continuing competition among elites striving for power would enable politically dominant groups to pass cost onto the remainder of society, thereby operating as a de facto form of default.
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德·维蒂·德·马尔科与李嘉图之公共债务:自我消亡还是违约?
19世纪末和20世纪初最著名的意大利理论家安东尼奥·德·维蒂·德·马可(Antonio de Viti de Marco)接受了大卫·李嘉图(David Ricardo)的主张,即特别税收和公共贷款是等价的。尽管分析出发点相同,但他们对公共债务的理论却大相径庭。此外,在这种分歧中,存在着连接微观和宏观分析水平的两种截然不同的分析方案之间的根本鸿沟。李嘉图将宏观集合视为分析原语,个体行为由这些集合诱导。与之形成鲜明对比的是,de Viti将个体变量视为原始变量,并通过这些个体变量之间的相互作用诱导出聚合条件。在德维提提出的一个完全合作的国家框架内,公共债务将会自我熄灭。德·维提还认识到,民主从来不是完全合作的,因为精英们争夺权力的持续竞争将使政治上占主导地位的群体把成本转嫁给社会的其余部分,从而作为一种事实上的违约形式运作。
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