Evidence for a Debt Financing Channel in Corporate Investment

R. Greenwood
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引用次数: 14

Abstract

In the simplest frictionless theory, an increase in interest rates causes a symmetric decline in investment for all firms because they discount new projects at a higher cost of capital. I develop and test a specific debt-market financing channel that predicts cross-sectional differences in the response of investment to interest rates. Firms with high levels of short-term debt suffer a decline in net worth, relative to firms financed with long-term debt, when nominal interest rates increase. When collateral constraints are binding, these firms reduce investment relative to the frictionless benchmark. In U.S. firm-level data between 1953 and 2001, the investment of firms with a high current portion of debt is more sensitive to interest rates when compared with firms that have little debt or only long-term debt. Consistent with my predictions, firms with high levels of short-term debt also display higher investment sensitivity to inflation.
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企业投资中债务融资渠道的证据
在最简单的无摩擦理论中,利率的增加会导致所有公司投资的对称下降,因为它们以更高的资本成本贴现新项目。我开发并测试了一个特定的债务市场融资渠道,该渠道预测了投资对利率反应的横截面差异。当名义利率上升时,相对于长期债务融资的公司,拥有高水平短期债务的公司净值会下降。当抵押品约束具有约束力时,这些公司相对于无摩擦基准减少投资。在1953年至2001年间的美国公司层面数据中,与债务很少或只有长期债务的公司相比,拥有高流动债务部分的公司的投资对利率更为敏感。与我的预测一致,短期债务水平高的公司对通胀也表现出更高的投资敏感性。
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