Bootstrapping Security Configuration for IoT Devices on Networks with TLS Inspection

V. Danilchenko, Matthew S. Theobald, Daniel Cohen
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Abstract

In the modern security-conscious world, Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) proxies are increasingly often used on industrial and enterprise networks to perform TLS unwrapping on all outbound connections. However, enabling TLS unwrapping requires local devices to have the DPI proxy Certificate Authority certificates installed. While for conventional computing devices this is addressed via enterprise management, it's a difficult problem for Internet of Things ("IoT") devices which are generally not under enterprise management, and may not even be capable of it due to their resource-constrained nature. Thus, for typical IoT devices, being installed on a network with DPI requires either manual device configuration or custom DPI proxy configuration, both of which solutions have significant shortcomings. This poses a serious challenge to the deployment of IoT devices on DPI-enabled intranets. The authors propose a solution to this problem: a method of installing on IoT devices the CA certificates for DPI proxy CAs, as well as other security configuration ("security bootstrapping"). The proposed solution respects the DPI policies, while allowing the commissioning of IoT and IIoT devices without the need for additional manual configuration either at device scope or at network scope. This is accomplished by performing the bootstrap operation over unsecured connection, and downloading certificates using TLS validation at application level. The resulting solution is light-weight and secure, yet does not require validation of the DPI proxy's CA certificates in order to perform the security bootstrapping, thus avoiding the chicken-and-egg problem inherent in using TLS on DPI-enabled intranets.
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基于TLS检测的物联网设备自启动安全配置
在现代具有安全意识的世界中,深度包检测(DPI)代理越来越多地用于工业和企业网络,以在所有出站连接上执行TLS解包。但是,启用TLS展开要求本地设备安装DPI代理证书颁发机构证书。对于传统的计算设备来说,这是通过企业管理来解决的,而对于物联网(“IoT”)设备来说,这是一个难题,因为物联网设备通常不在企业管理之下,甚至可能由于其资源受限的性质而无法做到这一点。因此,对于典型的物联网设备,安装在带有DPI的网络上需要手动配置设备或自定义DPI代理配置,这两种解决方案都有明显的缺点。这对在支持dpi的内部网上部署物联网设备构成了严重挑战。作者提出了一个解决这个问题的方法:在物联网设备上安装DPI代理CA的CA证书,以及其他安全配置(“安全引导”)。提出的解决方案尊重DPI策略,同时允许IoT和IIoT设备的调试,而无需在设备范围或网络范围内进行额外的手动配置。这是通过在不安全的连接上执行引导操作,以及在应用程序级别使用TLS验证下载证书来实现的。由此产生的解决方案轻量级且安全,但不需要验证DPI代理的CA证书来执行安全引导,从而避免了在启用DPI的内部网上使用TLS所固有的先有鸡还是先有蛋的问题。
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