Judicial independence and the enforcement of the constitution in Lesotho

Abstract

This article assesses the performance of the superior courts in Lesotho in their duty to uphold the constitution. Since it is axiomatic that the courts’ ability in this regard is necessarily intertwined with their institutional independence, the twists and turns that characterise the trajectory of the development of a fully‐fledged concept of judicial independence in Lesotho are traced. While the judiciary evolved slowly from within the executive during a good part of the colonial period, it received full institutional independence under the 1965/66 Constitutions and, in addition to this, it was bestowed with a broad jurisdictional competence under the 1993 Constitution. By and large, constitutional cases against the executive disposed of in the post‐1993 era reflect that, using its institutional independence as a basis, the judiciary has provided a solid and effective check and balance role to the executive, thereby living up to its mandate to uphold the Constitution and ensure the rule of law.