You Are Who Your Friends Are: An Experiment on Trust and Homophily in Friendship Networks

Fabian Winter, M. Kataria
{"title":"You Are Who Your Friends Are: An Experiment on Trust and Homophily in Friendship Networks","authors":"Fabian Winter, M. Kataria","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2347536","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We study the existence of homophily (i.e. the tendency for people to make friends with people who are similar to themselves) with respect to trustworthiness. We ask whether two friends show similarly trustworthy behavior towards strangers, and whether this is anticipated by outsiders. We develop a simple model of bayesian learning in trust games and test the derived hypotheses in a controlled laboratory environment. In the experiment, two trustees sequentially play a trust game with the same trustor, where the trustees depending on treatmen are either friends or strangers to each other. We affirm the existence of homophily with re- spect to trustworthiness. Trustors' beliefs about the trustees' trustfulness are not affected by the knowledge about the (non-)existent friendship between the trustees. Behaviorally, however, they indirectly reciprocate the (un-)trustworthy behavior of one trustee towards his/her friends in later interactions.","PeriodicalId":399171,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science eJournal","volume":"40 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2013-10-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"6","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Philosophy of Science eJournal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2347536","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 6

Abstract

We study the existence of homophily (i.e. the tendency for people to make friends with people who are similar to themselves) with respect to trustworthiness. We ask whether two friends show similarly trustworthy behavior towards strangers, and whether this is anticipated by outsiders. We develop a simple model of bayesian learning in trust games and test the derived hypotheses in a controlled laboratory environment. In the experiment, two trustees sequentially play a trust game with the same trustor, where the trustees depending on treatmen are either friends or strangers to each other. We affirm the existence of homophily with re- spect to trustworthiness. Trustors' beliefs about the trustees' trustfulness are not affected by the knowledge about the (non-)existent friendship between the trustees. Behaviorally, however, they indirectly reciprocate the (un-)trustworthy behavior of one trustee towards his/her friends in later interactions.
查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
你就是你的朋友:友谊网络中信任和同质性的实验
我们研究了同质性(即人们倾向于与与自己相似的人交朋友)在可信度方面的存在。我们问两个朋友是否对陌生人表现出相似的值得信任的行为,以及这是否被外人所期待。我们在信任游戏中建立了一个简单的贝叶斯学习模型,并在受控的实验室环境中测试了推导出的假设。在实验中,两个受托人依次与同一受托人玩信任游戏,根据对待的不同,受托人彼此是朋友还是陌生人。我们肯定在可信赖性方面同质性的存在。受托人对受托人信任的信念不受受托人之间存在(不存在)友谊的知识的影响。然而,在行为上,它们间接地回报了一个受托人在以后的互动中对他/她的朋友的(不)可信行为。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
期刊最新文献
Theory of Imagination in Economic Games Menopause as a Regulatory Device for Matching the Demand for Children with Its Supply: A Hypothesis Adjustments and Compromises of Household Economy Approach in Burkina Faso On Joan Robinson’s Completely Successful Indoctrination of John Kenneth Galbraith: Turning a Potential Keynesian Into an Actual Robinsonian Expected Utility in 3D
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1