Winter is Coming: Controlled Conflicts and the Oil-Price Geopolitical-Risk Premium

Mahmoud A. El-Gamal
{"title":"Winter is Coming: Controlled Conflicts and the Oil-Price Geopolitical-Risk Premium","authors":"Mahmoud A. El-Gamal","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3008756","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This paper presents a simple oil-exporting-country dynamic growth model with investment, consumption, passive military spending, and active military spending. Passive military spending (arms buildup) adds to security, while active military spending (conflict) depletes it, but adds to output and hence civilian capital (as a proxy for geopolitical risk premium in oil prices) in a non-monotonic way (some geopolitical risk is good for an oil exporter, but too much risk is not). It is shown that when the risk premium is sufficiently small, the optimal policy function does not support any positive active military spending at any levels of civilian capital and security. However, with sufficiently high geopolitical risk premium, the model country engages in controlled conflict (positive active military spending) when civilian capital is low. A controlled conflict in the latter case can shift the production function up, allowing the country to boost its consumption and arms buildup. This explains the big increase in the geopolitical risk premium following the Arab Spring, which included, among other disruptions, a military intervention by Saudi Arabia in Bahrain, as well as the smaller geopolitical risk premium following the recent Saudi-led war against the Houthis in Yemen. If oil prices remain low, depleting the civilian capital of Saudi Arabia and other oil-exporters, it may be rational, according to our model, to expect greater military activity, both to deal with geopolitical risks in the region, and to boost oil prices through the geopolitical risk premium.","PeriodicalId":436211,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Natural Resource Economics (Topic)","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2016-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"2","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"ERN: Natural Resource Economics (Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3008756","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2

Abstract

This paper presents a simple oil-exporting-country dynamic growth model with investment, consumption, passive military spending, and active military spending. Passive military spending (arms buildup) adds to security, while active military spending (conflict) depletes it, but adds to output and hence civilian capital (as a proxy for geopolitical risk premium in oil prices) in a non-monotonic way (some geopolitical risk is good for an oil exporter, but too much risk is not). It is shown that when the risk premium is sufficiently small, the optimal policy function does not support any positive active military spending at any levels of civilian capital and security. However, with sufficiently high geopolitical risk premium, the model country engages in controlled conflict (positive active military spending) when civilian capital is low. A controlled conflict in the latter case can shift the production function up, allowing the country to boost its consumption and arms buildup. This explains the big increase in the geopolitical risk premium following the Arab Spring, which included, among other disruptions, a military intervention by Saudi Arabia in Bahrain, as well as the smaller geopolitical risk premium following the recent Saudi-led war against the Houthis in Yemen. If oil prices remain low, depleting the civilian capital of Saudi Arabia and other oil-exporters, it may be rational, according to our model, to expect greater military activity, both to deal with geopolitical risks in the region, and to boost oil prices through the geopolitical risk premium.
查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
冬天来了:控制冲突和油价地缘政治风险溢价
本文提出了一个简单的石油出口国动态增长模型,包括投资、消费、被动军事开支和主动军事开支。被动的军事开支(军备建设)增加了安全,而主动的军事开支(冲突)消耗了安全,但以一种非单调的方式增加了产出,从而增加了民用资本(作为油价地缘政治风险溢价的代表)(一些地缘政治风险对石油出口国有利,但过多的风险则不是)。结果表明,当风险溢价足够小时,在任何民用资本和安全水平上,最优政策函数都不支持任何积极的主动军事支出。然而,在地缘政治风险溢价足够高的情况下,模式国家在民用资本较低的情况下参与可控冲突(积极的主动军事支出)。在后一种情况下,一场受控制的冲突可以提高生产功能,使该国能够促进消费和军备建设。这解释了阿拉伯之春之后地缘政治风险溢价的大幅上升,其中包括沙特阿拉伯对巴林的军事干预,以及最近沙特领导的对也门胡塞武装的战争之后地缘政治风险溢价的缩小。如果油价保持低位,耗尽沙特阿拉伯和其他石油出口国的民用资本,根据我们的模型,预期更多的军事活动可能是合理的,这既是为了应对该地区的地缘政治风险,也是为了通过地缘政治风险溢价推高油价。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
期刊最新文献
Natural Resources, Institutions and the Quality-adjusted Human Capital How Many km2 of Solar Panels in Spain and how much battery backup would it take to power Germany On the Long-Term Coupling and Short-Term Decoupling of Crude Oil and Natural Gas Prices Structural Behavioral Models for Rights-Based Fisheries Stranded Fossil Fuel Reserves and Firm Value
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1