Is Pregnancy Really a Good Samaritan Act?

Abstract

One of the most influential philosophical arguments in favor of the permissibility of abortion is Judith Jarvis Thomson’s violinist analogy, presented in “A Defense of Abortion.” Its appeal for prochoice advocates lies in Thomson’s granting that the fetus is a person with equivalent moral status to any other human being, and yet demonstrating—to those who accept her reasoning—that abortion is still permissible. In her argument, Thomson draws heavily on the parable of the Good Samaritan, arguing that gestating a fetus in some circumstances is what she calls a Good Samaritan act, and claiming that we are not morally required to be Good Samaritans. Here, I argue that Thomson has subverted the parable to justify an action that is the antithesis of its meaning. I contend that Christians are required to be Good Samaritans, and explain that for Christians, this entails that abortion is impermissible in all circumstances. Furthermore, I argue that the parable shows that the fetus is our neighbor in need of our mercy and assistance, and consequently, Christians should be actively involved in helping to ensure the unborn are protected, whether they are fetuses in danger of induced abortion or miscarriage, or surplus frozen embryos.