{"title":"Environmental Violations Monitoring and Analysis Based on Game Theory","authors":"Yong Zhu, Zheng Li","doi":"10.1109/CICN.2013.129","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The difficulty of the environmental management system is that the monitoring and supervision of the environmental violations, the paper constructs a model of Prisoner's Dilemma Game between regulators and sewage companies. Studies have shown that the regulatory frequency with the increase of penalties can effectively reduce illegal polluting behavior, thus helping to improve the level of government environmental governance.","PeriodicalId":415274,"journal":{"name":"2013 5th International Conference on Computational Intelligence and Communication Networks","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2013-09-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2013 5th International Conference on Computational Intelligence and Communication Networks","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CICN.2013.129","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
The difficulty of the environmental management system is that the monitoring and supervision of the environmental violations, the paper constructs a model of Prisoner's Dilemma Game between regulators and sewage companies. Studies have shown that the regulatory frequency with the increase of penalties can effectively reduce illegal polluting behavior, thus helping to improve the level of government environmental governance.