Dual-Process Theories, Cognitive Decoupling and the Outcome-to-Intent Shift: A Developmental Perspective on Evolutionary Ethics

Gordon P. D. Ingram, Camilo Orlando Moreno Romero
{"title":"Dual-Process Theories, Cognitive Decoupling and the Outcome-to-Intent Shift: A Developmental Perspective on Evolutionary Ethics","authors":"Gordon P. D. Ingram, Camilo Orlando Moreno Romero","doi":"10.31234/osf.io/dc5rz","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"A central tenet of evolutionary ethics is that as a result of evolutionary processes, humans tend to respond in certain ways to particular moral problems. Various authors (particularly those associated with “dual-process” theories of reasoning) have posited conflicts between “fast”, automatic, evolved impulses and more controlled judgements that may be more flexible and respond to culturally determined. In this chapter we argue that the evolutionary sources of automatic moral judgements are quite diverse, and include some intuitive processes (specifically, reading other people’s intentions) that are quite sophisticated from a social-cognitive point of view. We further argue that processes of controlled, reflective moral reasoning represent the activity of higher-level process that arbitrate between conflicting inputs from diverse automatic heuristics, in response to normative concerns. The integration and subjugation of automatic responses to more reflective ones is a developmental process that develops at varying rates in different people and in different cultural contexts. To make this argument, we first consider how approaches that represent cognition in terms of two types of processes – including but not limited to the automatic/reflective distinction – can be rendered more sophisticated by a consideration of evolutionary developmental psychology. We then apply this more developmentally aware approach to an extended example of the phenomenon in children’s moral development known as the outcome/intent shift. We finish by outlining a model that shows how automatic and controlled processes may be integrated in children’s social learning in culturally variable ways.","PeriodicalId":326049,"journal":{"name":"Synthese Library","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2019-12-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Synthese Library","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/dc5rz","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1

Abstract

A central tenet of evolutionary ethics is that as a result of evolutionary processes, humans tend to respond in certain ways to particular moral problems. Various authors (particularly those associated with “dual-process” theories of reasoning) have posited conflicts between “fast”, automatic, evolved impulses and more controlled judgements that may be more flexible and respond to culturally determined. In this chapter we argue that the evolutionary sources of automatic moral judgements are quite diverse, and include some intuitive processes (specifically, reading other people’s intentions) that are quite sophisticated from a social-cognitive point of view. We further argue that processes of controlled, reflective moral reasoning represent the activity of higher-level process that arbitrate between conflicting inputs from diverse automatic heuristics, in response to normative concerns. The integration and subjugation of automatic responses to more reflective ones is a developmental process that develops at varying rates in different people and in different cultural contexts. To make this argument, we first consider how approaches that represent cognition in terms of two types of processes – including but not limited to the automatic/reflective distinction – can be rendered more sophisticated by a consideration of evolutionary developmental psychology. We then apply this more developmentally aware approach to an extended example of the phenomenon in children’s moral development known as the outcome/intent shift. We finish by outlining a model that shows how automatic and controlled processes may be integrated in children’s social learning in culturally variable ways.
查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
双过程理论、认知解耦与结果-意图转换:进化伦理学的发展视角
进化伦理学的一个核心原则是,作为进化过程的结果,人类倾向于以特定的方式回应特定的道德问题。不同的作者(特别是那些与“双过程”推理理论有关的作者)提出了“快速”、自动、进化的冲动和更有控制的判断之间的冲突,这些判断可能更灵活,对文化决定作出反应。在本章中,我们认为自动道德判断的进化来源是相当多样化的,并且包括一些从社会认知的角度来看相当复杂的直觉过程(特别是,阅读他人的意图)。我们进一步认为,受控制的反思性道德推理过程代表了更高层次过程的活动,该过程在来自各种自动启发式的冲突输入之间进行仲裁,以响应规范问题。在不同的人和不同的文化背景下,对更多反思的自动反应的整合和征服是一个发展过程,以不同的速度发展。为了论证这一论点,我们首先考虑如何通过考虑进化发展心理学,将两种类型的过程(包括但不限于自动/反射区分)来表示认知的方法变得更加复杂。然后,我们将这种更具发展意识的方法应用于儿童道德发展中被称为结果/意图转变的现象的扩展示例。最后,我们概述了一个模型,该模型显示了自动和受控过程如何以文化可变的方式整合到儿童的社会学习中。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 去求助
来源期刊
CiteScore
0.30
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
期刊最新文献
Economics and Ecology From Classical to Quantum Classical Mechanics Special Relativity Where the Action Is
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1