How Using Greenspan’s Continuum Can Bridge the Huge Abyss That Exists Between Orthodox and Heterodox Economists Who Are Dealing With the Concept of Uncertainty

M. E. Brady
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引用次数: 4

Abstract

In spite of the detailed work, done by Keynes in 1908 ,1921,and 1936 in his second Fellowship dissertation for Cambridge University, A Treatise on Probability, and the General Theory, respectively ,and by Knight in 1921 in Risk, Uncertainty and Profit ,that argued convincingly that uncertainty was a range that extended from complete ignorance to complete knowledge, economists are completely divided over what uncertainty means and its relevance. Orthodox economists place emphasis on using the extreme outcome of complete knowledge ,since this allows them to assume that all decision makers know the probability distributions, while heterodox economists place emphasis on using the other extreme outcome of complete ignorance, since this allows them to assume that decision makers do not know the probability distributions. Greenspan’s continuum specifies that the entire range or continuum between complete ignorance and complete knowledge is important to consider, not just the extremes. The current polarization of the economics profession could only benefit from agreeing to use Greenspan’s continuum as a planning tool for economic analysis. There are very significant difficulties with the concept of rational expectations as developed by Muth in 1960 regarding the interpretation of probability he is using. Was it subjective or objective? It can't be both.
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如何用格林斯潘的连续统来跨越存在于正统和非正统经济学家之间的巨大鸿沟
尽管凯恩斯分别在1908年、1921年和1936年在他的第二份剑桥大学奖学金论文《概率论》和《通论》中以及奈特在1921年的《风险、不确定性和利润》中做了详细的工作,令人信服地论证了不确定性是一个从完全无知延伸到完全知识的范围,但经济学家对不确定性的含义及其相关性完全存在分歧。正统经济学家强调使用完全知识的极端结果,因为这允许他们假设所有决策者都知道概率分布,而非正统经济学家强调使用完全无知的另一个极端结果,因为这允许他们假设决策者不知道概率分布。格林斯潘的连续统一体指出,在完全无知和完全知识之间的整个范围或连续统一体是重要的考虑,而不仅仅是极端。如果同意使用格林斯潘的连续统一体作为经济分析的规划工具,那么当前经济学专业的两极分化只会受益。理性预期的概念是Muth在1960年提出的,对于他所使用的概率的解释有很大的困难。是主观的还是客观的?不可能两者都是。
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