Recovery from DoS Attacks in MIPv6: Modeling and Validation

Abstract

Denial-of-service (DoS) attacks form a very important category of security threats that are prevalent in MIPv6 (mobile internet protocol version 6) today. Many schemes have been proposed to alleviate such threats, including one of our own [9]. However, reasoning about the correctness of such protocols is not trivial. In addition, new solutions to mitigate attacks may need to be deployed in the network on a frequent basis as and when attacks are detected, as it is practically impossible to anticipate all attacks and provide solutions in advance. This makes it necessary to validate the solutions in a timely manner before deployment in the real network. However, threshold schemes needed in group protocols make analysis complex. Model checking threshold-based group protocols that employ cryptography have not been successful so far. Here, we propose a new simulation based approach for validation using a tool called FRAMOGR that supports executable specification of group protocols that use cryptography. FRAMOGR allows one to specify attackers and track probability distributions of values or paths. We believe that infrastructure such as FRAMOGR would be required in future for validating new group based threshold protocols that may be needed for making MIPv6 more robust.