{"title":"Automated analysis of cryptographic protocols using Mur/spl phi/","authors":"John C. Mitchell, Mark Mitchell, U. Stern","doi":"10.1109/SECPRI.1997.601329","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"A methodology is presented for using a general-purpose state enumeration tool, Mur/spl phi/, to analyze cryptographic and security-related protocols. We illustrate the feasibility of the approach by analyzing the Needham-Schroeder (1978) protocol, finding a known bug in a few seconds of computation time, and analyzing variants of Kerberos and the faulty TMN protocol used in another comparative study. The efficiency of Mur/spl phi/ also allows us to examine multiple terms of relatively short protocols, giving us the ability to detect replay attacks, or errors resulting from confusion between independent execution of a protocol by independent parties.","PeriodicalId":114355,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings. 1997 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (Cat. No.97CB36097)","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"1997-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"483","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Proceedings. 1997 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (Cat. No.97CB36097)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SECPRI.1997.601329","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 483
Abstract
A methodology is presented for using a general-purpose state enumeration tool, Mur/spl phi/, to analyze cryptographic and security-related protocols. We illustrate the feasibility of the approach by analyzing the Needham-Schroeder (1978) protocol, finding a known bug in a few seconds of computation time, and analyzing variants of Kerberos and the faulty TMN protocol used in another comparative study. The efficiency of Mur/spl phi/ also allows us to examine multiple terms of relatively short protocols, giving us the ability to detect replay attacks, or errors resulting from confusion between independent execution of a protocol by independent parties.