Policy Implementation in ASEAN and the European Union: The Problem of Asymmetric Compliance

Abstract

The paper highlights the problem of asymmetric compliance in the context of international regulatory cooperation, with specific reference to the case of ASEAN. The asymmetry may be across countries, when some of the stipulating parties are compliant and others are not; and between different policies covered by the same ‘multi-purpose’ treaty. Administrative capacity may differ from one country to another and from one policy to another. Countries have different administrative traditions and performance. However, bureaucratic quality is not homogeneous, and varies in the different countries. Furthermore, strategies of compliance and non-compliance in a multi-party and multi-game setting are also more complex. Some countries might be tempted to free-ride on other countries loyal cooperation; or to adopt a strategy of selective cooperation according to the kind of policy. Moreover, private stakeholders influence in different ways implementation and compliance; but not with the same intensity in all policies. Their pressure is supposed to be stronger in market areas, where they can benefit from the removal of national barriers, than in non-market ones.In such a context, the existence of a truly supranational organization with an administrative infrastructure might limit agency losses: partly because it can directly perform some implementation tasks; and partly because it is better equipped to monitor effective compliance by member states and national administrations. Promoting administrative convergence and regulating national administrations can reduce ineffective implementation and non-compliance too. This is why that the role of the ASEAN Secretariat and other supranational bodies could be usefully extended in a pragmatic way, without any formal change of the ASEAN Charter. Specific agreements and directives can delegate implementation and supervisory tasks to the ASEAN Secretariat or other instrumental bodies, on a case by case basis. The strengthening of a supranational administrative system could take place without any general and explicit rejection of the ‘ASEAN way’ to common policy implementation. In principle, member states could continue to deny any conferral of general authority to the ASEAN Secretariat or other related bodies. In practice, however, they could recognize, through specific agreements, that giving limited executive and supervising powers to supranational administrations could be the best way to pursue a proper and coherent implementation of common rules and policies.