{"title":"Force-Structure Comparisons of the Armies at Gettysburg","authors":"Douglas R. Kleinsmith","doi":"10.1353/GET.2016.0012","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Force-Structure Comparisons of Armies with their own direct and general support artillery. However, this organizational force structure had just been established following the army’s most recent battle at Chancellorsville in May of 1863. In fact, from the time the Army of Northern Virginia fi rst came into being, before the gates of Richmond in the 1862 Peninsula Campaign, to this most recent change, it had gone through numerous reorganizations of one form or another. More than anything, the perceived personalities and capabilities of prospective commanders drove the methodology behind the organizational construction of the Army of Northern Virginia. Much of this involved the personal taste of the commanding general, Lee, which included how well commanders worked with each other, what size organization they could eff ectively handle, and what credentials and loyalties they possessed. Consequently, this army underwent forcestructure reorganizations aft er every campaign, due in large part to offi cer casualties and reassignment of ineff ective commanders. Th ese reorganizations ranged from the creation of new corps to the juggling of brigades and divisions in order to fi t the personalities and capabilities of the various commanders.1 In the beginning of the war, Confederate military acts did not account for organizations larger than a division. Consequently, at the start of the 1862 Peninsula Campaign, Joseph E. Johnston, who commanded what became the Army of Northern Virginia, had six independent divisions loosely grouped under three wings. Following Johnston’s wounding, Lee assumed command and inherited a","PeriodicalId":268075,"journal":{"name":"Gettysburg Magazine","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2015-12-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Gettysburg Magazine","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1353/GET.2016.0012","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Force-Structure Comparisons of Armies with their own direct and general support artillery. However, this organizational force structure had just been established following the army’s most recent battle at Chancellorsville in May of 1863. In fact, from the time the Army of Northern Virginia fi rst came into being, before the gates of Richmond in the 1862 Peninsula Campaign, to this most recent change, it had gone through numerous reorganizations of one form or another. More than anything, the perceived personalities and capabilities of prospective commanders drove the methodology behind the organizational construction of the Army of Northern Virginia. Much of this involved the personal taste of the commanding general, Lee, which included how well commanders worked with each other, what size organization they could eff ectively handle, and what credentials and loyalties they possessed. Consequently, this army underwent forcestructure reorganizations aft er every campaign, due in large part to offi cer casualties and reassignment of ineff ective commanders. Th ese reorganizations ranged from the creation of new corps to the juggling of brigades and divisions in order to fi t the personalities and capabilities of the various commanders.1 In the beginning of the war, Confederate military acts did not account for organizations larger than a division. Consequently, at the start of the 1862 Peninsula Campaign, Joseph E. Johnston, who commanded what became the Army of Northern Virginia, had six independent divisions loosely grouped under three wings. Following Johnston’s wounding, Lee assumed command and inherited a
军队的力量结构比较与他们自己的直接和一般支援炮兵。然而,这种组织结构是在1863年5月的钱瑟勒斯维尔战役之后才建立起来的。事实上,从1862年半岛战役中里士满城门之前,北弗吉尼亚军团第一次形成以来,到最近的这次改组,它经历了无数次这样或那样的改组。最重要的是,对未来指挥官的个性和能力的认知推动了北弗吉尼亚陆军组织建设背后的方法。这在很大程度上与指挥官李将军的个人品味有关,包括指挥官之间的合作有多好,他们能有效处理的组织规模有多大,他们拥有什么样的资历和忠诚。因此,这支军队在每次战役后都要进行部队结构重组,主要原因是军官伤亡和无效指挥官的调动。这些重组的范围从创建新的军团到调整旅和师,以适应不同指挥官的个性和能力在战争开始时,南方邦联的军事行动并不包括一个师以上的组织。因此,在1862年半岛战役开始时,约瑟夫·e·约翰斯顿(Joseph E. Johnston)指挥了后来的北弗吉尼亚军团(Army of Northern Virginia),他有六个独立的师,松散地编成三个联队。约翰斯顿受伤后,李接替了他的指挥权,并继承了一个