{"title":"The Authority and the Membership of the Commission in the Future","authors":"","doi":"10.1163/9789004434271_032","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The legal and political world order established after the Second World War envisaged a multilateral arena where States could have more interaction than in the past. International law aspired to deal with a larger field of objects in the relations among States. It also saw the end of the colonial world and, thus, an increase in the number of States. Soon after this new order’s implementation, the question of the new subjects and their international legal capacity became an issue. The enlargement of the field of the objects of international law and the increasing number of States led to the conclusion that there was a need for precise and universal rules, acceptable to all States, existing or yet to be created. The Charter of the United Nations acknowledged that feature of the emerging international community and in Article 13, paragraph 1 (a), provided that the only plenary body of the United Nations – the General Assembly – should “initiate studies and make recommendations for the purpose of promoting international cooperation in the political field and encouraging the progressive development of international law and its codification”. Consequently, in its resolution 174(ii), the General Assembly established the International Law Commission to give effect to this Charter provision, and it also offered a description of what constitutes progressive development and codification, respectively.1 Other colleagues have already addressed this issue in detail and with merit.2 What I would like to stress here is that, shortly after commencing its work, the International Law Commission realized that making the distinction between progressive development and codification was not easy, and as early as in 1956, the Commission gave up any pretence to be strict in that differentiation.3 In fact, as it was emphasized by SecretaryGeneral Dag Hammarskjöld, “[t] he reluctance of Governments to submit their controversies to judicial","PeriodicalId":219261,"journal":{"name":"Seventy Years of the International Law Commission","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2020-10-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Seventy Years of the International Law Commission","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004434271_032","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
The legal and political world order established after the Second World War envisaged a multilateral arena where States could have more interaction than in the past. International law aspired to deal with a larger field of objects in the relations among States. It also saw the end of the colonial world and, thus, an increase in the number of States. Soon after this new order’s implementation, the question of the new subjects and their international legal capacity became an issue. The enlargement of the field of the objects of international law and the increasing number of States led to the conclusion that there was a need for precise and universal rules, acceptable to all States, existing or yet to be created. The Charter of the United Nations acknowledged that feature of the emerging international community and in Article 13, paragraph 1 (a), provided that the only plenary body of the United Nations – the General Assembly – should “initiate studies and make recommendations for the purpose of promoting international cooperation in the political field and encouraging the progressive development of international law and its codification”. Consequently, in its resolution 174(ii), the General Assembly established the International Law Commission to give effect to this Charter provision, and it also offered a description of what constitutes progressive development and codification, respectively.1 Other colleagues have already addressed this issue in detail and with merit.2 What I would like to stress here is that, shortly after commencing its work, the International Law Commission realized that making the distinction between progressive development and codification was not easy, and as early as in 1956, the Commission gave up any pretence to be strict in that differentiation.3 In fact, as it was emphasized by SecretaryGeneral Dag Hammarskjöld, “[t] he reluctance of Governments to submit their controversies to judicial