{"title":"The Extensive Form of a Game","authors":"","doi":"10.1142/9789813227361_0011","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"! Repeated game example: Wage setting ! Extensive form of a game ! Information sets Example: Wage setting ! Stage game ! One firm, one worker ! The firm offers the worker a wage, w ! The worker accepts or rejects the firm's offer ! Reject: the worker becomes self-employed at wage w 0 ! Accept: Work (disutility e), or Shirk (disutility 0) ! If the worker works (supplies effort): Output is high=y ! If the worker shirks: Output is high with probability p, and low=0 with probability 1-p ! The firm does not observe the worker's effort decision ! The output of the worker is observed by both parties","PeriodicalId":435813,"journal":{"name":"A Course in Game Theory","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2020-07-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"A Course in Game Theory","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1142/9789813227361_0011","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
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Abstract
! Repeated game example: Wage setting ! Extensive form of a game ! Information sets Example: Wage setting ! Stage game ! One firm, one worker ! The firm offers the worker a wage, w ! The worker accepts or rejects the firm's offer ! Reject: the worker becomes self-employed at wage w 0 ! Accept: Work (disutility e), or Shirk (disutility 0) ! If the worker works (supplies effort): Output is high=y ! If the worker shirks: Output is high with probability p, and low=0 with probability 1-p ! The firm does not observe the worker's effort decision ! The output of the worker is observed by both parties
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